Consensus across Multiple Divides: An Empirical Study of Outlooks Underlying Lawyers\u27 Attitudes on Multidisciplinary Practice by Casey, Greg & Needham, Carol A.
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 32
Issue 3 Spring 2001 Article 5
2001
Consensus across Multiple Divides: An Empirical
Study of Outlooks Underlying Lawyers' Attitudes
on Multidisciplinary Practice
Greg Casey
University of Missouri-Columbia
Carol A. Needham
Saint Louis University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Legal Profession Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law
Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Greg Casey, & Carol A. Needham, Consensus across Multiple Divides: An Empirical Study of Outlooks Underlying Lawyers' Attitudes on
Multidisciplinary Practice, 32 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 617 (2001).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol32/iss3/5
Consensus Across Multiple Divides: An Empirical
Study of Outlooks Underlying Lawyers' Attitudes on
Multidisciplinary Practice
Greg Casey & Carol A. Needham*
I. INTRODUCTION
Lawyers hold a variety of views regarding the advisability of
permitting attorneys to join multidisciplinary practices.1  The
professional regulations currently in effect preventing lawyers from
practicing law within the same entity with members of other
professions,2 the development of these restrictions,3 the evolution of the
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sent to the authors at caseyg@missouri.edu and needhamc@slu.edu.
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and 1999-2000 Chair of its MDP Committee), Keith Birkes, Christopher Janku and Jack Wax. In
addition, we want to express our appreciation to Kathleen Clark, Steven Paro, and Dennis Tuchler
for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts and to Vicky Wilkins for her assistance in
executing research on this project.
1. The term "multidisciplinary practice," when used in this Article, refers to an entity which
the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice described as:
[A] partnership, professional corporation, or other association or entity that includes
lawyers and non-lawyers and has as one, but not all, of its purposes the delivery of
legal services to a client(s) other than the MDP itself or that holds itself out to the
public as providing nonlegal, as well as legal, services. It includes an arrangement by
which a law firm joins with one or more other professional firms to provide services,
and there is a direct or indirect sharing of profits as part of the arrangement.
ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Recommendations, Report, and Reporter's
Notes on the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Appendix A (1999), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/multicom.html [hereinafter ABA Commission, 1999 Final Report].
2. See, e.g., Mary C. Daly, Choosing Wise Men Wisely: The Risks and Rewards of Purchasing
Legal Services from Lawyers in a Multidisciplinary Partnership, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 217
(2000); James W. Jones & Bayless Manning, Getting at the Root of Core Values: A "Radical"
Proposal to Extend the Model Rules to Changing Forms of Legal Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV.
1159 (2000); Laurel S. Terry, A Primer on MDPs: Should the "No Rule Become a New Rule?,"
72 TEMP. L. REV. 869 (1999).
3. Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on Multidisciplinary Practice: Their
Derivation, Their Development, and Some Implications for the Core Values Debate, 84 MINN. L.
REV. 1115 (2000) (tracing the restriction against sharing fees with non-lawyers to a 1909 New
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market for legal services, 4 and the history of the American Bar
Association's ("ABA") effort to investigate the issue in the late 1990's
have been ably presented elsewhere. 5  Attorneys' varying views of
multidisciplinary practice ("MDP") and how their views overlap,
however, has not been fully explored. This Article examines the results
of a study designed to contemplate differing views on MDP.
The main reason for undertaking the study discussed in this Article
was to build a more nuanced picture of attorneys' concerns and beliefs
underlying their views of MDP. The Bar leaders who commissioned
this study wanted to explore potential areas of agreement among
attorneys. Our findings of common ground among the attorneys who
participated in the study can furnish a basis for discussions, negotiations
and possible compromise on these issues.
This Article begins by briefly touching on recent actions taken
concerning MDP.6  It then presents the inception, design and
methodology of the study that is the basis of this article. 7 Next, the
sharply delineated constellations of opinions regarding MDP that
emerged from the analysis of the raw data are described.8 Finally, the
Article examines the precise issues that present possible areas of
consensus among the three groups identified in this study.9 This was
accomplished by using the participants' prioritization of the concepts
presented in the study to create a more detailed model of the array of
opinions held by the members of each of the three groups.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Recommendations of the ABA MDP Commission
MDP has been a contentious issue for a number of years. Recently,
the ABA considered whether to recommend that lawyers be allowed to
form MDPs. In 1998, the ABA appointed the Commission on
York State statute prohibiting corporations from practicing law, including furnishing lawyers to
clients, and imposing criminal penalties for violations).
4. See, e.g., John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, Multidisciplinary Practice and the
American Legal Profession: A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal Services in
the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83 (2000); Daniel R. Fischel, Multidisciplinary
Practice, 55 BUS. LAW. 951 (2000).
5. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, Multidisciplinary Practice, Professional Regulation, and the Anti-
Interference Principle in Legal Ethics, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1469 (2000); Charles W. Wolfram, The
ABA and MDPs: Context, History and Process, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1625 (2000).
6. See infra Part II.A (discussing recent actions taken by the ABA concerning MDP).
7. See infra Part II.B (providing the background on this study).
8. See infra Part HI (discussing the study and its results).
9. See infra Part IV-V (discussing areas of possible common ground on the issue of MDP).
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Multidisciplinary Practice (the "MDP Commission") to study the extent
to which professional services firms not run by lawyers were offering
legal services. On June 8, 1999, the MDP Commission recommended
that the ABA's Model Rule 5.4 be amended and proposed Model Rule
5.8 be adopted to allow lawyers to offer legal services with
multidisciplinary practice.' 0 The members of the ABA's House of
Delegates decided at the 1999 annual meeting not to adopt any changes
to the Model Rules unless further investigation supported the conclusion
that MDPs were in the public interest, and posed no danger to the "core
values" of the legal profession. I "
In May 2000, the MDP Commission wrote a formal report and
recommendation to the ABA House of Delegates in which the
Commission approved fee-sharing and the concept of lawyer-controlled
MDPs, while reiterating the importance of protecting the legal
profession's core values.' 2  Although the ABA's House of Delegates
definitively ended the work of the MDP Commission when it voted by a
three-to-one margin to reject the Commission's May 2000
recommendation, 13 the on-going transformation of the market for the
delivery of legal services has kept discussion of the issue alive.
Although the focus of attention regarding potential action related to
the issue has returned to the state level, 14 the national discussion
regarding the propriety of permitting MDP has continued. Academic
conferences on the issue have recently been held in a variety of forums,
including the law schools at Vanderbilt and Wake Forest. 15  Many
10. 15 ABA-BNA, LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 250 (1984).
11. Id. at 396.
12. The MDP Commission's report stated, "Lawyers should be permitted to share fees and
join with non-lawyer professionals [identified as] ... members of recognized professions or other
disciplines that are governed by ethical standards ... in a practice that delivers both legal and
nonlegal services (Multidisciplinary Practice) .... " Report to the House of Delegates (May 11,
2000), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpfinalrep2000.html.
13. At the ABA's annual meeting on July 11, 2000, the House of Delegates voted down the
MDP Commission's proposal 314 to 106, preferring to maintain unchanged the language in
Model Rule 5.4. At the same meeting, the House also voted to disband the MDP Commission,
voting 292 to 152 against deferring final consideration of MDP. 16 ABA-BNA, LAWYERS'
MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 368 (1984).
14. See, e.g., Sheryl Stratton & Lee A. Sheppard, American Bar Association Says No to
Multidisciplinary Practice, 88 TAX NOTES 311 (2000) (discussing the end of the ABA's effort to
articulate standards on the leading edge of this debate). Delegate Robert Keatinge declared the
view that further ABA action will likely be limited to ABA sections "acting as clearing houses for
information regarding what the states are doing." Id. at 316; see also Dzienkowski & Peroni,
supra note 4, at 87.
15. The articles written for the conference held on March 30, 2001 at Wake Forest are
published in a symposium issue of the Wake Forest Law Review.
2001]
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commentators, including the authors of this Article, see the MDP issue
as one whose final resolution has not yet become clear.
B. Development of the Study
While what the legal community will ultimately decide concerning
MDP is not yet apparent, it is clear that lawyers across the country will
have to face this issue in the future. Studying public opinion on an
emerging controversy is unwieldy because large segments of the
relevant public are not yet fully aware of the pertinent issues. A random
survey of the public would squander resources because many people
contacted would obviously not have thought through a topic of which
they are still unaware. Also, measurement error is likely when people
are asked about a topic on which they are not knowledgeable.
The debate over whether or not lawyers should be allowed to practice
in a multidisciplinary entity is such an emerging controversy.
Permitting MDP would require changing the current rules of
professional responsibility governing lawyers' conduct. Under the
current regulations, lawyers cannot practice law in partnership with
members of other professions. In addition, law firms cannot be owned,
in part or full, by a non-lawyer or an entity not controlled by lawyers.
Although questioning these rules goes back as far as 1982 when the
Kutak Commission proposed a revision that would have allowed MDP
in certain circumstances, the issue was temporarily shelved when the
ABA House of Delegates defeated the proposed revision in 1983. It is
likely that only a small group of those active in the ABA in the early
1980's were highly aware of the issues involved at that time. In the late
1990's, a new reform effort began within the ABA. Despite
considerable publicity within the legal profession, it is likely that only a
very small proportion of the nearly one million American lawyers have
closely followed developments on this issue after it re-surfaced in 1998.
The leadership in the Missouri Bar wanted to respond in a timely way
to the ABA's request for reaction to the MDP Commission's proposal.
It originally considered doing a membership survey of attitudes toward
MDP so that its members' preferences could guide its MDP Committee.
Initial discussions involving Jennifer Gille Bacon, Jack Wax, Keith
Birkes and one of the authors culminated in the realization that the issue
was so novel that many members of the Bar had not yet developed firm
opinions about it.
The issue of undue elitism also arose. Specifically, development of a
survey instrument to measure attitudes on such a new idea risked
advantaging facets of the issue deemed important by the authors of the
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survey. Questions posed in an initial survey might later become key
premises in discussion and argument on the issue, to the detriment of
peripheralized alternative issues. Survey results are often treated as
officially recognized knowledge, and issues initially peripheralized
might remain submerged. Not only would this make the parameters of
the debate unduly reflect the pet ideas of the survey initiators, it would
also keep the debate from representing submerged views on MDP held
by Bar members. To show a democratic regard for how members of the
Bar thought about the issue, a more grass-roots approach to exploring
their views was used.
Faced with the need to formulate a state bar response to the ABA
initiative on the issue of MDP, and wishing to take into consideration its
members' preferences (insofar as those preferences had crystallized),
the leaders of the Missouri Bar decided on an approach combining
qualitative and quantitative techniques. Our study was a result of that
decision. Working from the premise that lawyers are quick learners, we
decided that most lawyers could quickly determine where they stood if
they had good information on the issue. But what information should
be given them? Much of the material already available strongly
advocated positions, often in a polarized way (either "pro" or "con"),
and many arguments in this literature were highly speculative. Much of
the literature was also highly formal in style, even when not particularly
partisan. Could we develop information on MDP expressed in objective
terms, containing shorter, pithier arguments, using more colloquial
wordings to make the information more accessible to Missouri
attorneys?
A two-step process of inquiry was used. In the first stage, a highly
varied sampling of Missouri lawyers was interviewed about its views of
MDP and its implications. In the second stage, these lawyers'
perceptions, views, stories and opinions on MDP became raw material
for the information compiled and given to the subjects participating in
the study.
1. Initial Inquiry Stage
Individual interviews, focus groups and group interviews were
conducted in late Fall 1999. Lawyers in varied practice settings were
selected for interviews: those working in accounting firms, managing
partners of law firms, attorneys practicing in large law firms, and those
practicing family law, eldercare law and international law. Each of
these groups of lawyers had incentive to be informed about MDP.
Lawyers who practice in the areas of family law and eldercare have
indicated that they might be more likely than lawyers with other types
2001]
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of practices to be interested in forming or joining an MDP with
professionals in other disciplines if the professional responsibility rules
were changed to permit them to do so. International lawyers can be
expected to have a greater degree of exposure to the concrete realities of
the issue, since in their practice they have the opportunity to encounter
lawyers from countries that permit MDPs. 16 Lawyers that are currently
employed by accounting firms have experience with some of the issues
that are central to the MDP debate (since they are working closely with
members of a profession that has gone furthest towards acquiring law
practices). Finally, managing partners of large law firms have a unique
vantage point from which to view the pressures of economic
competition facing lawyers.
Members of other professions, including accountants, financial
planners, psychologists, counselors and consumer advocates, were also
interviewed on the topic of MDP. Like the attorneys interviewed, these
professionals also have an incentive to develop opinions on the creation
of MDPs with lawyers. Some of these professions, such as financial
planning and psychology, do not impose prohibitions on forming
partnerships with lawyers, while others, such as accounting, may
impose some restrictions but also have an economic incentive towards
certain mergers. Finally, consumer advocates' relative lack of direct
economic self-interest gives them a valuable perspective on the delivery
of professional services to the public.
The individual interviews were relatively unstructured. Subjects
were asked open-ended questions about what they had heard regarding
MDPs. This usually led to considerable expression of opinion on the
subject. Using a standard protocol, they were then asked to imagine a
hypothetical law firm. If the rules were changed to permit MDPs,
would this firm merge with an accountancy firm? Would it have a
greater number of clients as an MDP, or fewer as a result of conflicts of
interest or other reasons? Further questions sought opinions on how
confidentiality would work in a merged firm and whether conflicts
should be imputed to the non-attorney members of the MDP. After
eliciting opinions on the unauthorized practice of law ("UPL") in an
MDP, the interview turned to issues related to the types of clients who
would want to retain the members of an MDP. In the participant's
opinion, would these be primarily businesses or primarily ordinary
people who wanted one-stop shopping? Next, the participant read
16. For an excellent discussion of the experience of lawyers in Germany, a country that
expressly permits practice within an MDP, see Laurel S. Terry, German MDPs: Lessons to Learn,
84 MINN. L. REV. 1547 (2000).
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through the text of the changes in the Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility suggested by the ABA MDP Commission. Those
suggested changes were discussed. Finally, the interviewer sought the
participant's overall opinion: Should the Missouri Bar change its rules
and permit MDPs?
Although some interviewees knew little at the outset and did not
develop much opinion during the discussion, most warmed to the topic
and articulated incisive perceptions, opinions and usable quotes on the
topic. Interviews were conducted either individually (most by
telephone, some in person) or in groups. The focus groups (i.e., the
group interviews) were held in Kansas City, St. Louis and Columbia, a
mid-state college town near the capital. These cities were also the
locations of most of the interviews in this phase of the study. One of
the focus groups contained only lawyers while the other two included
members of other professions in addition to attorneys.
A professional facilitator guided the focus group participants through
a list of topics similar to those covered in the individual interviews. The
facilitator asked each participant to recount what he or she had heard
about MDPs. Then a hypothetical professional service firm involving
lawyers and members of all the professions represented at the table was
suggested, and each participant was asked for reactions to this firm.
The consumer advocate was asked how it might seem to consumers, and
all were queried on how it would impact the ability to keep the client's
confidences. The discussion then turned to several other topics,
including: fee sharing between the members of the various professions,
marketing of services, handling conflicts of interest, UPL, regulation of
the professions, the types of clients who might want to receive legal
services from an MDP, as well as the types of clients who might prefer
a traditional law firm. Each focus group discussion took about two
hours to complete.
Transcripts and notes from these discussions were then mined for
statements about MDP and related topics. We extracted 749 separate
statements, propositions, notions and concepts. The statements on MDP
were then sifted through to choose the statements to be given to those
participants in the second stage.
2. Balanced Design Stage
The selected statements were provided in the second stage of the
inquiry to a second, larger sampling of attorneys.' 7 Of course, not all
17. The larger grouping contained some who were interviewed earlier and who had
contributed comments, as well as others new to the study at this point.
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749 statements could be presented to this second group; only a sample
of statements could be effectively used. So a subset of 55 statements,
highly varied in content, tone, length and voice, was chosen for this
phase of the study. 1
8
The following procedures were used to cull out statements and leave
only 55 statements. The opinions expressed in the focus group and
individual interviews were transcribed, redacted for brevity and
grammatical correctness, and printed on separate pieces of card-stock.
Working with the raw text of the statements, Professor Casey physically
separated them by theme. The categories that emerged as key themes
were: (1) the clients' needs and interests; (2) law practice and its
problems; (3) MDP and its economic/business potential; (4) regulation
of the legal profession; (5) UPL; and (6) core values of the legal
profession, including privilege and conflict of interest.
All statements made in the focus groups and individual interviews
could reasonably be sorted into one of these six categories. Within each
category, all statements were further sorted according to the direction of
opinion which they expressed (whether it was implied or direct): (a)
positive towards MDP; (b) neutral, indifferent, ambivalent or non-
committal regarding MDP and (c) negative towards MDP. This
exercise in textual analysis left a balanced design with 18 groupings of
opinion statements. We eliminated similar statements within each of
the groups. Then, serious choices were made to narrow the number of
statements to 72.
In making this last reduction, keen attention was given to preserving
particular slants, voices and sub-themes. For instance, if a positive
statement on the notion of "one-stop shopping" was culled out, a
negative or a neutral one would be kept, to ensure representation of a
label or buzzword that could in its precise phrasing be more meaningful
for particular respondents. Balanced design heightens representation of
broad themes, and judicious choice of statements from the grid of
balanced design helps ensure variance in sub-themes, even in micro-
themes. In this way, subjects can work with a highly varied body of
18. One wants a number of statements great enough to permit high variation in the statements,
but low enough to make working with the statements easy for the subjects. Using 25 statements
would be easy for the subjects, but probably would not be enough to encompass a high level of
variety in the rhetoric. Conversely, using 100 statements would encompass highly varied
rhetoric, but would be unwieldy for the subjects who would probably balk, frustrating the purpose
of the study. As the number of statements presented to the participants is increased, the variance
in themes becomes more reliable. However, if the number of statements presented is too high,
there is a risk that some of the participants may fail to complete the sorting process.
[Vol. 32
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rhetoric on MDP. 19 At this point, Bar staff helped eliminate more
statements until only 55 were left. At least one statement came from
each of the 18 categories. Some categories were represented by as
many as four statements. This procedure ensured that the resulting set
of statements used to measure attitudes towards MDP was broadly
based and reflected the variety of views and opinions given by lawyers
and other professionals who had discussed MDP in the focus groups and
initial interviews. Each statement was printed on a separate card, and
randomly assigned a number from 1 through 55. Such a set of
statement-cards is termed a "Q-sort, 2 ° and the method used is called
"Q-methodology."
3. Q-Sorts & Q-Methodology
A number of published Q-studies have investigated matters of legal
interest. Specifically, a study weighing the competing influence of
gender and ethnic loyalties in interpreting the controversial Justice
Thomas confirmation hearings has been completed.21  Further, a Q-
study has demonstrated that judges have five separable ways of viewing
19. For example, on the issue of one-stop shopping, two negative (i.e., anti-MDP) statements
were retained: #8 ("One-stop shopping pressures the consumer. Suddenly there's a referral; one's
hand is forced a little."), and #20 ("The idea that MDP is motivated by the desire to promote one-
stop shopping is just smoke."). One-stop shopping was a sub-theme nestled within the general
category (1) the clients' needs and interests. Many positive statements of this sub-theme within
this larger category were culled out. For instance, one professional stated: "Many people
complain about the round robin of appointments with various professionals." Another
commented: "It would be better if professionals could work more in tandem than out of separate
compartments." Both these latter statements justify one-stop shopping and are, therefore, pro-
MDP, but to keep the balance in the final set of fifty-five statements they were culled because
other pro-MDP statements had been selected to keep other sub-themes represented. It matters
little whether the statements are negative or positive; working with the statements, subjects can
disagree or agree to express their views on any statement regardless of the way the statement is
phrased.
20. Professor William Stephenson devised this technique for attitudinal measurement in the
1930s as a psychologist teaching at Oxford University. Later, he continued his work on the
technique at the University of Chicago and at the University of Missouri. The classic
presentation of the theory is contained in two of his books. See WILLIAM STEPHENSON, THE
PLAY THEORY OF MASS COMMUNICATION (1967); WILLIAM STEPHENSON, THE STUDY OF
BEHAVIOR: Q-TECHNIQUE AND ITS METHODOLOGY (1953). A brief tutorial on the method is
available at http://facstaff.uww.edu/cottlec/Qarchive/qindex.html. Steven Brown and other social
scientists have continued Stephenson's work with the technique. See STEVEN R. BROWN,
POLITICAL SUBJECTIVITY: APPLICATIONS OF Q-METHODOLOGY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (1980);
see also BRUCE MCKEOWN & DAN THOMAS, Q-METHODOLOGY (1988); Greg Casey, Intensive
Analysis of a "Single" Issue: Attitudes on Abortion, 10 POL. METHODOLOGY 97, 97-124 (1984)
(demonstrating how the multiple competing concerns driving discussion of a controversial
politico-legal issue can be better understood with Q-method).
21. Dan Thomas, Craig McCoy & Allan McBridge, Deconstructing the Political Spectacle:
Sex, Race, and Subjectivity in Public Response to the Clarence Thomas/Anita Hill "Sexual
Harassment Hearings," 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 699, 699-720 (1993).
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their role on the bench. 22  Finally, a Q-study has been conducted
demonstrating the variety of responses among members of the public
indicating politically cohesive groupings when confronted with reports
of an overtly politicized judicial selection process. 23
Professor William Stephenson dubbed this technique of
psychological measurement "Q" because the type of factor analysis 24 it
employs inverts the matrix from the form used in conventional
psychological measurement, a form often referred to as "R" factor
analysis. In R-methodology, for example, the matrix is aligned with the
subjects 25 each occupying one column, while each particular statement
to which they are reacting occupies a row. When the data are reduced
by extracting underlying factors, the respondents are left intact. The
questions, however, are reduced from many to a few, each drawing a
similar response pattern from the subjects. The matrix below (Table 1)
provides a graphic representation of the process used in R-methodology.
The letters B through G across the top indicate individual persons. The
numbers 1 through 5 down the left side represent different statements,26
and the numbers in the columns represent each person's responses to
statements 1 through 5. After R-factor analysis, B through G would still
be discernable individuals, but 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 would be consolidated to
fewer than the five original underlying ideas or sentiments.
In Q-methodology, the matrix is aligned in the same way. When the
data are reduced in a Q-factor analysis, however, all the statements
remain, while the respondents are consolidated from many to a few.
Each remaining set of respondents left at that point reflects an attitude,
segment, outlook or school of thought shared by a group that recorded
similar responses to the statements. Each remaining group of
individuals is now termed a "Type." After performing the Q-analysis,
each statement from 1 through 5 would still remain. Similarly minded
individuals, however, would now be represented by a cluster or Type.
For example, the first cluster would include C and G, a second cluster
would include D and F and a third would include B and E.
22. Thomas D. Ungs & Larry R. Baas, Judicial Role Perceptions: A Q-Technique Study of
Ohio Judges, 6 LAW & Soc. REV. 343, 343-66 (1972).
23. Greg Casey, Public Perceptions of Judicial Scandal: The Missouri Supreme Court 1982-
88, 13 JUST. SYS. J. 284, 284-307 (1988-89).
24. Factor analysis is a statistical procedure used to reduce data.
25. Meaning, the people who respond to the measurement.
26. In reality, of course, the number of respondents in the matrix would exceed six. We could
denominate the persons as B, C, D, ... n,. Similarly, the number of statements would far exceed
five, and we can denominate the statements as 1, 2, 3 ... n2.
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Table 1. Q vs. R Matrix
B C D E F G
1 +4 +2 -1 +3 +1 0
2 -3 0 +2 -3 -3 -2
3 +3 0 +3 +4 +4 -1
4 +2 +4 +1 +1 +1 +3
5 -4 +1 +4 -4 +2 0
It bears mention that the Q-method, which is a balanced sampling
method, is unlike surveys in that its predictive value neither needs nor
relies on representative samples of subjects. A well-constructed survey
would seek a representative sample of subjects because it would use
those subjects' responses to generalize to the overall population's
responses. For example, representative sample surveys are used in
political polling. People in a randomly chosen sample are asked
whether they plan on voting for the candidate for a certain office
running as a Republican, Democrat, Libertarian, member of the Reform
Party, the Green Party and so on. If 56% of the sample indicates that it
intends to vote for the Democrat, the pollsters (having randomly
sampled the general public) use the properties of the normal distribution
to specify an interval, such as between 52% and 60%, within which they
are 95% confident that the true number lies.27 This means that the
polling form warrants that 19 out of 20 such polls would report a
number within the interval of 52% to 60%. This would be a reassuring
result for the Democratic candidate, because there is only one chance in
twenty that the true number28 lies outside that range. Moreover, the true
number could be higher, such as 63%, or lower but still a majority, such
as 50.2%.
Although surveys using the representative sample method are
valuable, they do have some limitations. One significant difficulty is
that of timing. Generally, the longer the time span between the poll and
election day, the more likely it is that voters' intentions could shift
before they step into the polling place, rendering the poll results less
reliably predictive of the election results. Polling until the last minute
helps counter this problem.
27. To be 99% confident, the confidence interval would have to be larger, e.g., between 49%
and 63%.
28. That is, the percentage of voters intending to vote for him or her.
20011
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A second difficulty in the reliability of the results in the
representative sample method concerns the possibility that the polling
firm might have manipulated (whether knowingly or unwittingly) the
procedure by which respondents are selected, resulting in a non-random
sample. In a telephone poll, for instance, the interviewers might ignore
certain telephone prefixes, or the results might be skewed because some
categories of voters (those intending to vote for a "fringe" party's
candidate, or municipal employees, for example) might be less willing
than others to declare their true intentions to the pollster. In a field
study, interviewers might avoid houses that look shabby, and arrange to
interview only in attractive suburban areas. In a mail out survey, the
return rate might be quite low. In any of these circumstances, the
choice of respondents who actually participate in the survey is no longer
as random. When the sample is not randomly chosen, the normal
distribution cannot be used to determine that the probability of the
sample being representative of the population set. Therefore, the survey
designer no longer has statistical theory to back up an assertion that the
true number (in this example, the percentage of voters planning to vote
for each candidate) bears a known relationship to the number found in
the subset polled.
A third difficulty centers on the wording of the questions the
participants answer. With good sampling and careful interviewing,
many of the difficulties discussed above can be kept at bay. But
wording of the question can lead those surveyed into giving set answers
or can confuse them. For instance, on the topic of MDP, the Marist
Institute for Public Opinion, a reputable polling center, questioned a
representative sample of members of the public.29 Because the general
public is quite unaware of the issues of UPL enforcement and the ABA
MDP Commission's proposal concerning MDP, the query first provided
a fairly lengthy factual description:
Most states allow only lawyers to perform certain services such as real
estate transactions, estate planning, wills, and some financial planning
matters. These state rules do not allow other professionals such as
accountants, financial planners, real estate consultants, and insurance
specialists to provide these services to consumers.
29. The Marist poll took place from October 18 through October 20, 1999. Americans
Support Lawyers Partnering with other Professionals, LEGAL MGMT., Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 8, 16-
17. The poll surveyed 1,013 adults via telephone. Id. Seven of ten respondents agreed that "the
legal profession's rules should be changed to allow lawyers and other professionals to work
together in the same firm." Id. The margin of error for the Marist poll is +/- three percent. Id.
For further discussion of this poll, see Poll Shows Americans Support MDPs, LAW FIRM
PARTNERSHIP & BEN. R. 2, Jan. 2000, at 5.
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In asking the follow-up question, the two alternative choices
presented were rotated, so that the order in which the propositions were
expressed would not affect the response given. The key question asked
next by the interviewer was:
Which opinion is closer to your own: some people think these rules
mainly benefit lawyers and should be changed to increase competition
and allow other professionals to provide these routine services; [or]
some people think these rules should not be changed because lawyers
have the expertise and other professionals should not be allowed to
provide these services.
A large majority of the people polled agreed with the first alternative
(66%), and a much smaller group (27%) agreed with the second, while
7% were unsure. A problem in the phrasing of the alternatives could
have skewed the results. Each alternative is a compound statement. In
evaluating the second alternative, for example, it is impossible to
determine the degree to which the subjects were responding to the idea
that "lawyers have the expertise" as distinguished from the idea that
"these rules should not be changed." Similarly, the first alternative
statement that "these rules mainly benefit lawyers" could have pulled in
agreement from people who have negative views of the legal
profession30 whether or not they agreed with the rest of the sentence. In
addition, the wording of the alternatives is not even-handed.
Characterizing the services that non-lawyers are prohibited from
providing as "routine" has the effect of skewing the response in a pro-
change direction. Furthermore, participants may harbor different ideas
about which specific services are included within the category of
"routine services."
In addition, the reason presented to support the "no change" position
omits mention of the impact of the potential loss of the attorney-client
privilege and the varying standards used to assess conflicts of interest. 31
Measurement error could easily have taken place in the Marist survey.
The difficulty of being certain that a representative sample survey has
been conducted in a manner that ensures the data collected can be
30. The finding that a significant number of people in the United States hold a negative view
of attorneys has been reported. See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce, Law Day 2050: Post-
Professionalism, Moral Leadership, and the Law as Business Paradigm, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
9, 9 n.4 (1999) (citing a series of polls indicating that the public generally views attorneys in a
negative light and lacks confidence in the legal profession); Randall Samborn, Anti-Lawyer
Attitudes Up, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 9, 1993, at 22 (describing a poll which revealed that the most
commonly articulated reason given for holding a negative opinion of lawyers is that "lawyers are
too interested in money").
31. The dimensions of these critically important aspects of the MDP debate are discussed
elsewhere. See, e.g., Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 4, at 174-91.
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reliably interpreted illustrates the difficulties encountered when public
response to a poll question dominates discourse on an issue, even
though measurement error may be suspected.
When using the Q-method, these types of eventualities do not affect
the reliability of the data collected. A random sample is not needed.
Rather than seeking to determine how many individuals have a
particular opinion or intention (such as a plan to vote for a certain
candidate), the Q-study sets out to uncover how people in various
situations assemble opinions and thoughts together to form an overall
viewpoint or philosophy. A sample for a Q-study needs variance, but it
need not be precisely in proportion to the variance found in the
population.
Thus, if it is possible that male and female lawyers might see the
opportunities and challenges presented by MDPs differently, it would
be important to arrange for some lawyers of both genders to participate
in the Q-sort, so that the views of both genders are represented.
Additionally, we might be concerned that the views of attorneys in rural
areas might differ from those of lawyers practicing in urban settings. If
so, it would be important to obtain Q-sort responses from some lawyers
practicing in each relevant type of geographic area. Alternatively, we
might think that firm size has an impact on one's views on the
desirability of MDPs. If so, we should ensure that the sample includes
respondents from firms of various sizes.
Finally, the Q-sort method permits the inclusion of statements that
are short or long, simple or compound, terse or verbose, and neutral or
studded with symbolic opinion cues. Each person revealing his or her
opinion will have a chance to contrast statements from a very large field
of statements. Instead of four questions on MDP as in the Marist study,
we used 55 statements, encompassing much more variety. As a result
of using the Q-sort method, we will be able to characterize our subjects
in a much more nuanced way than would be possible with a survey.
The Q-sort is a way to study people's subjective ideas and thoughts
on a particular topic, in this case, the advisability of permitting attorneys
to join MDPs. Instead of asking people to react to the partisan and
formal positions organized groups had presented on their issue, we
asked lawyers and members of other professions to respond to open-
ended questions, then distilled the responses for presentation to the
study participants. Our subjects thus had the opportunity to respond to
statements that reflected the opinions of people similar to themselves,
giving our opinion measures a grass-roots "bottom-up" quality distinct
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from the elitist, "top-down" quality of many other methods used to
measure opinion. 3
2
In this study, the deck of cards containing the 55 statements to be
used was printed in hundreds of copies, each copy a Q-sort kit. Besides
the statement cards, each kit contained a scoring sheet with instructions
on how to perform the Q-sort. Each candidate for the study was
directed to read the cards and then to begin sorting them out into those
presenting propositions with which the participant agreed, those with
which he or she disagreed, and those with which he or she neither
agreed nor disagreed.33 After forming three piles of cards, the
participant was then instructed to sort out the statements into degrees of
agreement and disagreement according to a set distribution, shown in
Table 2. This distribution results in a normal curve, which permits
informative and robust statistical tests, and is also "forced," meaning
that the sorter is induced to make many comparisons among the
statement cards to produce the final scoring distribution.
Table 2. Scoring Distribution for Missouri Bar MDP Q-Sort
Score: +5 +4 +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5
How
Many 3 4 5 6 6 7 6 6 5 4 3
Cards? I I II_
<--High -)Zone of Relative High Dis-
Meaning: Agreement Indifference<- agreement->
The Missouri Bar sent out approximately 300 of these kits. All
participants from the first stage of the research received one, as did all
persons initially contacted for participation in the first stage but who
could not be scheduled for interviews or focus groups because of time
constraints. In addition, all 21 members of the MDP Committee of the
Missouri Bar received a kit, as well as five additional kits for
32. SONDRA MILLER RUBENSTEIN, SURVEYING PUBLIC OPINION 212-15 (1996)
(demonstrating that many surveys use ill-thought-out questions authored by scholars or experts,
and concluding that more reliable information can be elicited through more extensive pretesting
of survey questions, use of focus interviews to induce subjects to "think aloud" while answering,
and efforts to get typical subjects to paraphrase wording authored by surveyors).
33. The subjects' reasons for including a statement in this non-reaction category could include
befuddlement, ambivalence, or indifference, among other rationales.
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distribution to other lawyers. Ultimately, 77 lawyers performed the Q-
sort, together with 10 members of other professions. This article
explores only the Q-sorts of the lawyers, although Appendix II gives the
results for the non-lawyer professionals as well.
In reading this Article, these basic terms will help the reader navigate
some of the technical language occasionally used.
" A Q-sort is a sorting of statements about a matter of opinion, each
statement having been printed on a separate card. Each subject in
this study performed the Q-sort with the same 55 statements
about MDP.34
* After doing his or her Q-sort, each subject records and reports his
or her responses, or the scores, which he or she assigns to each of
the 55 statements. The score sheet requires respondents to record
the numbers of all statements assigned the score of +5, with only
enough room to record the proper number of statements permitted
(in this case, 3). The completed score sheet gives us that
subject's array, or distribution of statement scores.
* All subjects' arrays are then analyzed to bring out underlying
patterns in response, grouping subjects who respond similarly to
the statements together as a factor type. Each factor type
represents a distinct way of thinking shared by the subjects who
form the factor. Factors are given Roman numerals (I, II)
* To form a factor, at least two subjects have to "load" on the
factor: their scores have to show that they are inclined towards
that factor's way of thinking. Using the normal curve, we look
for statistically significant loadings on factors.
" Subjects inclined to a factor contribute to the reconstruction of
that factor's typal array, or the ideal Q-sort that would be typical
of all participants who load on the factor. Subjects loading with
higher scores contribute more greatly, subjects loading with
lower scores contribute less, so that the typal array represents our
best estimate of how people typical of that way of thinking sort
out the opinion-statements.
" Finally, the typal arrays of each factor can be read and interpreted
to achieve insight into that factor-type's outlook, which reflects
those people's pattern of thoughts, as reflected in the way they
have arranged their opinion-statements hierarchically to show
how they operate from first premises to specific and concrete
applications of those values.
34. For the exact wording of these statements, see infra Appendix I.
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III. THE STUDY AND ITS RESULTS
In reading this description of attorneys' views on the possibility of
permitting the practice of law in multidisciplinary entities, all
statements from the typal arrays are given in this type font and
are inset to give readers a visual cue that wording is coming from the Q-
sort itself. The analysts' commentary on the typal array is in the type
font used in these paragraphs.
In Q-studies, statements with high scores are most important. These
are the opinions and arguments subjects accept (or reject) most
strongly-the ideas most central, or integral, to their viewpoint. In this
Q-study, statements with scores from 3 to 5, either positive or negative
(i.e., scores of +5, -5, +4, -4, +3, or -3) are those most significant to the
outlook of the subjects. Statements with lower scores (+2, -2, +1, -1, or
0) are, relatively speaking, in a "zone of indifference" and, therefore,
less deserving of note.35
As analysis of the themes of statements proceeds, a theme present in
some highly scored statements may be found to continue to reverberate
in statements with lower scores. This commentary may point to some
statements with scores less than +/-3; when doing so, it will quote the
statements, but the statements appear in italics in this type font.
Most commentary on statements with scores below +/-3 is subordinated
into footnotes.
Finally, note that statements presented to the subjects can be either
positive or negative in form, and that the participants can choose to
either agree or disagree with each statement. If a factor type agrees with
a positive statement, meaning is most clear; if a factor type disagrees
with a positive statement or agrees with a negative statement, meaning
is still fairly clear-cut. Interpreting meaning can become convoluted,
however, when a factor type disagrees with a negative statement.
Untangling the inversion of meaning may require some close reading.
To alert the reader that disagreement with a negative statement is
coming up, a negative term is used in the commentary, such as disputes,
not, never, does not like, or disagrees. This visual cue cautions the
reader to watch out for inversion of meaning. This cue is also
35. It should be noted that everyone's zone of indifference is personal and subjective; thus one
subject might, with a given Q-sort, find 40 statements with which he agrees, 5 with which he
disagrees, and 10 to which he is indifferent. In this case, following the analyst's instructions, this
subject would give some statements with which he agrees negative scores and will also give some
high negative scores to some statements on which he is indifferent. Thus, we must consider the
zone of indifference relative.
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occasionally used where disagreement with a positive statement could
be misunderstood in context.
A. The Factor Solution
Various factor solutions were evaluated. The simplest solution that
accurately described the results brought out two factors. 36 This solution
maximized the number of attorneys situated on factors, thus permitting
the maximum number of attorneys to contribute to the reconstruction of
the typal arrays.37
The solution is illustrated graphically in Figure 1 below.38 With two
factors, we only need two dimensions to depict individual attorneys'
location in the factor space. 39 Each participant in the Q-sort shows a
loading on each factor. Each loading is a number ranging from +1.0 to
-1.0 (in practice loadings rarely come close to 1.0 in value). The
vertical axis (y-axis) locates each attorney on Factor I, while the
horizontal axis (x-axis) locates each attorney on Factor II. Each
attorney is represented by a point at his or her co-ordinates; #26, for
instance, is near the top of the Figure, with a high loading of +.78 on
Factor I and an infinitesimal loading of +.03 on Factor II. Looking to
the right along the x-axis, we see #60, who has a high loading of +.60
on Factor II but a low loading of +.12 on Factor I. Looking down, we
see #51, who has a high negative loading of -.70 on Factor I and a low
loading of +.04 on Factor II. Loadings on Factor II to the left of the y-
axis would be negative, and we should note that only one person, #18,
has a negative loading (of -. 13) on Factor II; all other attorneys load
positively, even if weakly, on Factor II.
The attorneys are fanned across about half of the factor space
available; except for #18, nobody is on the left side of the y-axis. The
distribution forms an arc sweeping from the top around the right side to
the bottom. Some attorneys huddle on the inside of the arc, while others
36. We considered alternative factor solutions before settling on the two-factor solution. One
rejected alternative extracted four factors, and the second pulled out eight. Although more
complex, these solutions anchored fewer lawyers on factors. The rejected four factor solution
accommodated 56 lawyers, while the rejected eight factor solution brought in 57. The two factor
solution situated 62 lawyers. A separate report contrasting these solutions is available from the
authors on request.
37. This is termed a "reconstruction" because the subjects construct their views, while the
interpreters of those views assemble a new construction of those views after conducting an
analysis that involves dissection (i.e., recording scores for individual statements).
38. See infra p. 636.
39. Factor space is a graphic representation of the location of the study participants relative to
one another; the physical grouping permits a more visual appreciation of the contiguities,
juxtapositions and distances among participants outlooks.
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locate farther out toward its extremity. The closer an attorney is toward
the center, the more idiosyncratic his or her thinking is on MDP; the
farther out an attorney, the more he or she has thought it through along
the same lines as other attorneys. The scattering of the attorneys along
the arc is notable: it graphically demonstrates the lack of consensus on
MDP.
Based on these factor loadings, we could create two types: one with
high loadings on Factor II, and the other with high loadings on Factor I.
But, Factor I has people with both positive and negative scores.
Although most are positive, the large number of attorneys with negative
loadings makes the case for splitting the bipolar factor into its two
separate sides; by doing this, we can adequately portray attitudes at all
occupied areas in the arc of opinion. Thus, subjects at the top of the
figure, who load high (and positively) on Factor I, form Type I.
Reflecting these respondents' primary concerns, we have termed this
group "Ethics Conservatives." Subjects at the bottom of the figure, who
load high (and negatively) on Factor I, form Type II. We have
denominated this group as "Eclectic MDP Enthusiasts." Finally,
subjects at the right of the figure, who load high on Factor II, form Type
III, whom we refer to as "Liberals" in this study. In effect, three Types
are obtained from two factors by separating one factor into two Types.
4°
It is important to note that respondents which cluster into these groups
when considering the issues related to MDP do not necessarily share
common views on other topics. For example, study participants who
are members of Type III, whom we refer to as Liberals, may hold views
regarding environmental regulations, gun control, tax policy, capital
punishment and other public policy issues that would place them on the
conservative end of the political spectrum.
40. Since Factor II is not bipolar (only one negative loading, and very low), it is inappropriate
to split it; it is pointless to seek to characterize a location in factor space unoccupied by attorneys.
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B. Demographics of Subjects
In all, 87 subjects completed usable Q-sorts. Seventy-seven of these
were attorneys. (The ten non-lawyer professionals who completed sorts
are included in the dataset, but do not contribute to the construction of
types, and are not included on Figure 1; see Appendix II for details.)
This level of participation reflects an excellent rate of return and
includes more than enough attorneys to reliably test the differences
between the respondents' positions.
We asked for a small amount of demographic information from
attorney participants: attorneys could indicate their gender; whether
they were in private practice, government work, business, or other; and
whether their firm size (if private practice) was solo, 2-5 lawyers, 6-15
lawyers, 16-40 lawyers, or over 40 lawyers.
Participation in the Q-sort was entirely voluntary and confidential.
Results were mailed directly to the University of Missouri Research
Center. Subjects could give their name, and many did, or could remain
anonymous. The identities of those who gave their names are protected
under research ethics. As expected, many Q-sort sets were not
returned-attorneys are busy people, and those not contacted in the fall
phase of the study were probably less invested in the project. Many
other attorneys may have intended to do the sort but were rushed by
other deadlines. The final 77 attorneys self-selected themselves to be in
the study, and we, therefore, had little control over their demographics.
Of the 77 attorneys, 16, or 21%, were women and 61, or 79%, were
men. About 28% of Missouri Bar members are female,41 so we have a
subset that reflects gender fairly well. Given our low control over
demographics, we have enough women that we can be confident of
reflecting the thinking of female attorneys in the study.
Private practice settings predominated among the 77 attorneys; 66, or
86%, were in private practice. Only 11 attorneys in our subset were in
government, business, or "other" types of work. "Other" could include
consulting for a CPA firm, teaching law, or retirement, and was also
used if the lawyer doing a Q-sort did not check off his or her practice
setting. Of the 11, 3 lawyers were in government, 3 in business and 5 in
"other." Fifty-eight percent of the members of the Missouri Bar are in
private practice. Clearly, private practitioners were more inclined than
other lawyers to participate in this study. In part, this may be due to the
41. Missouri Bar Economic Survey, at 1 (1999), at http://www.mobar.org/info/
econ-survey99.htm.
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fact that permitting MDPs to operate may have a more immediate
impact on the lives of attorneys in private practice. If professional
responsibility regulations were changed to permit MDPs, market
developments such as potential formation of MDPs, increased
competition from Financial Services providers and new opportunities
for lateral movement are likely to directly affect private practitioners.
In contrast, lawyers working in government or as in-house counsel will
not experience as dramatic a shift in their work environment.42
However, changes in the regulations governing the structure of the
practice of law would potentially affect lawyers working in certain
"other" settings-such as CPA firms, banks or other providers of
professional and financial services-even more directly than most other
attorneys would be affected.43 If and when the Bar considers new rules
that would liberalize practice to allow lawyers working in settings other
than traditional law firms to "hold themselves out" as attorneys in those
settings, a follow-up study should be conducted to ascertain their views
more accurately, given their scant representation in the set of
respondents in this study. Contrastingly, if the Bar considers stricter
enforcement of existing rules-such as a crackdown on the
unauthorized practice of law by out-of-state lawyers giving legal advice
outside traditional law firms-these lawyers' views again should be
represented in greater numbers than are included in this sample group.
Since few statements in the Missouri MDP Q-sort bear on UPL
enforcement or holding out, these are subsidiary issues in this study and
42. Note that an important work environment change for in-house counsel would be to expand
the choices available to them as representatives of major consumers of legal services, as well as to
permit some in-house counsel to potentially oversee profit-generating operational sources of
revenue for their employers rather than simply remaining a cost-center.
43. The ABA focus group study conducted in 2000 of lawyers' concerns demonstrated that
most attorneys were unconcerned about global trends such as MDP and internet startup firms,
where they saw these trends as having no immediate effect on their work. The two types of
lawyers most concerned about these trends were firm decision-makers and the youngest cohort of
associates in the largest firms. The group interviews were held in May and June, 2000. See The
Pulse of the Legal Profession, Phase 1, REPORT TO THE MARKET RESEARCH OF THE AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION 27 (Nov. 22, 2000). Some confirmation of this trend is seen in a survey
conducted by Edward L. Summers. See Edward L. Summers, Attitudes of Professionals Toward
Multidisciplinary Professional Practices 8 (2000), Current Research Projects, available at
http://bevo2.bus.utexas.edu/faculty/ed.summers. In Summers' data, younger attorneys and
attorneys in larger firms were both more favorable to forming MDP firms and likelier to believe
that MDPs would become a viable market force. Neither the Summers nor the ABA data can be
considered generalizable, unfortunately. The ABA studies were focus groups putting forth only
exploratory and suggestive findings. Summers' study, while mailed out to a random sample of
the Texas State Bar, had only a 20% return rate, too low to allow for statistical inference. Id. at
10. Nonetheless, the convergence of these results is an interesting demographic correlate for later
exploration.
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the relative silence of lawyers in these practice settings is not a matter of
significant concern.
Firm size among private practitioners in the study is fairly well
distributed. Of the 66 attorneys in private practice, 7, or 11%, are in
solo practice; 16, or 24%, are in firms with 2-5 lawyers; 13, or 20%, are
in firms with 6-15 lawyers; 8, or 12%, are in firms with 16-40 lawyers;
and 22, or 33%, are in firms with over 40 lawyers. The Missouri Bar
Economic Survey permits some comparison to this distribution: in
1998, 30% of lawyers were engaged in solo practice, 20% in firms with
2-4 lawyers, 15% in firms with 5-9 lawyers, 11% in firms with 11-19
lawyers, 5% in firms of 20-29 lawyers, 2.5% in firms of 30-49, and
16.5% in firms over 50. 44  Solo practitioners are obviously
underrepresented among the subjects in the current study. Lawyers in
large firms are overrepresented, while intermediate firm sizes are
proportionally represented.45
C. Demographics of Types
Sometimes a Q-study will suggest that a particular demographic trait
is tied to a particular viewpoint. This can be a useful theory for later
testing, but proves little, because we do not have a representative
sample of people with that demographic trait. Here we look at how the
demographic traits we measure relate to the three viewpoints that we
identify. Gender provides an intriguing look at how this works. Table 3
(below) shows that male attorneys show all three viewpoints, while
female attorneys show only two of the three, not loading on Type II.
This does not mean that female attorneys do not share in Type II's
considerations or concerns, but simply that we did not find a female
attorney who did so. If we had continued the Q-sort, one or more
women lawyers of Type II might have appeared, but we cannot say for
sure. A random sampling of women lawyers participating in a Q-sort
might bring to light many women who share in Type II's views. All
that we can say given the current data is that only male attorneys
showed a Type II viewpoint.
44. Missouri Bar Economic Survey, supra note 41.
45. It should be noted that 24% of those performing this Q-Sort were private practitioners at
law firms with 2-5 lawyers, while 20% practice in firms with 6-15 attorneys, and 33% work in
firms of 40 or more attorneys.
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Table 3. Gender and Distribution of Attorney Viewpoint Types
Gender: Type I: Type II: Type III: Unassigned: Totals:
Male: 28 8 14 11 61
Female: 8 0 7 1 16
Totals: 36 8 21 12 77
Table 4 (below) shows the distribution of practice settings among the
viewpoint types. Attorneys from firms of all sizes think in terms of the
viewpoints of Type I and III, but only two firm sizes are represented in
the viewpoint of Type II. If this were a random sample, we might be
drawn to the idea that Type II is the thinking of lawyers in very large
firms and of lawyers in business and "other" practices, with a few
exceptions (the one lawyer in a firm with 2-5 lawyers). But such a
conclusion is unwarranted because our lawyers are not selected
randomly.
Table 4. Practice Settings and Distribution of Attorney Viewpoint Types
Private Firm Size: Settings Other than
Private Practice:
Type: Solo 2-5 6-15 16-40 > 40 Gov't Bus. Other Totals
Atty Attys Attys Attys Attys
I: 3 9 10 3 8 2 0 1 36
II: 0 1 0 0 3 0 1 3 8
III: 2 2 1 4 9 1 2 0 21
Untyped 2 4 2 1 2 0 0 1 12
Totals: 7 16 13 8 22 3 3 5 77
Instead, we can suggest that Type II might be somewhat unusual among
attorney viewpoints in several ways:
* Type II has the fewest attorneys, with only 8; more attorneys (12)
were unassignable to types than appeared on this type;
* Type II is the negative pole of Type I, which had the largest
number of attorneys (36), so without reference to specific
opinions in this viewpoint, we know already that it is a contrarian
outlook;
" Type II attracted no women lawyers in our study. The
significance of this fact may merit some additional attention in
later studies; and
[Vol. 32
Consensus Across Multiple Divides
* Type II is bunched into larger firms and non-private practice,
which suggests the possibility of segmentation-i.e., that certain
practice settings are more likely than others to nurture this
outlook.
Despite these concerns about Type II (which can only be resolved by
performing further studies), Types I and III cause no concerns, since
they are well distributed among the practice settings and genders. We
can, thus, proceed to analysis of the three outlooks on MDP with
relatively good assurance that we have gotten a good subset of
attorneys, representing both genders and varied types of work settings,
to grapple with the issues underlying MDP.
1. Type I: Ethics Conservatives
The single largest grouping of respondents, those in Type I, can most
accurately be termed "Ethics Conservatives" from the key premise from
which most of their ideas about MDP derive. This large group of
attorneys (N=36) is most concerned with ethical aspects of the legal
profession's core values: avoiding conflicts of interest, maintaining
client confidences and confidentiality, and derivative procedures for
safeguarding these important values. In the top two scoring categories
of the Q-sort, nearly half of these participants' statements bear on this
theme; in the top three scoring categories, more than a third embody
it.46 Legal ethics is the anchor of this group's thinking. Table 5 shows
how the typical Ethics Conservative would prioritize concepts related to
MDP. This table indicates that the classic Ethics Conservative would
strongly agree with statements #20, #28 and #26, while strongly
disagreeing with statements #47, #49 and #11.
46. The top two scoring categories (+5, -5, +4, and -4) contain 14 slots for statements (3 each
for the 5 values, 4 each for the 4 values); of these 14 slots, 6, or 43%, are filled by legal ethics
statements in Type I's typal sort. If we extend the breakdown to the +3 and -3 scoring categories,
each of which contains 5 slots, we get a total of 24 slots, of which 9 are filled by legal ethics
statements, for a percentage of 37.5%.
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Table 5. Typal Array of a Classic Ethics Conservative
Scores:
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5
47 39 14 32 35 21 37 25 48 3 26
49 42 4 44 27 40 54 8 5 41 28
11 24 2 52 45 19 53 10 18 16 20
22 50 29 1 15 31 33 55 36
34 43 12 51 46 38 13
6 9 30 7 23
17
a. Legal Ethics
First, Ethics Conservatives strongly agree that the main reason for
preserving current rules is the importance of core values (#26, +5):
The principal arguments for retaining such
prohibitions relate to concerns about the
profession's core values, specifically
professional independence of judgment, the
protection of confidential client information,
and loyalty to the client through the avoidance
of conflicts of interest.
It is important for the client to keep other professionals in practice
groups separated from the attorneys representing the client. This
separation protects the client's interest by providing a check and
balance (#28, +5):
Currently, if you have an attorney and an
accountant who are independent of each other,
the client has the advantage of having two
separate professionals, each looking over the
other's shoulder. You are going to lose that
by putting them both in one firm. Their
interest will be the same and you've lost the
objectivity that comes from having two
independent professionals.
The chief problem posed by MDP is, therefore, not its economic or
business aspect, but rather its ramifications for confidentiality (#3, +4):
There may not be a business problem with MDP
but there is a confidentiality problem. It
gets back to the hard ethical questions that
Consensus Across Multiple Divides
govern lawyers but not accountants or any of
the folks that we're talking about combining
with.
A particular difficulty with an MDP firm is the way conflicts of interest
might mushroom for lawyers (#41, +4):
For the purposes of a conflict of interest
analysis, the lawyer would have to treat each
and every client of the MDP as his/her own
client.
A further concern is that MDP might put non-lawyers in charge of the
ethical decisions that lawyers alone should be making (#16, +4):
If lawyers would be in the minority in an MDP,
conflict of interest as lawyers see it could be
overruled.
Ethics Conservatives disagree that experience resolving conflicts in
large law firms could serve as a model for handling conflict of interest
in MDP firms (#24, -4):
If conflict of interest can be resolved in a
large law firm, it can be resolved in a merged
accountancy-law firm.
They further dispute that conflict of interest problems can be resolved
through disclosures to clients and client waivers (#14, -3):
The key way to avoid conflict of interest is to
make a disclosure to the client: does the
client want the relationship to continue
despite this?
Moreover, they think that the existence of a conflict of interest itself is
more significant than is the severity of the conflict (#2, -3):
Conflict of interest is based not just on the
existence of a conflict but on the volume of
that interest.
Disagreement with this statement seems based on its premise that
existence of a conflict of interest might be discounted if it is minor, or
moot; Ethics Conservatives may not countenance any watering down of
strict ethics, nor any lawyer action/decision not upholding a narrow
interpretation of the rules. Ethics Conservatives are also quick to sound
the alarm on the difficulties the non-lawyer members of an MDP might
face in continuing to adhere to their profession's ethical standards
within an MDP. Even where attorneys might not transgress the legal
profession's ethical norms, they are concerned that attorneys going all
out for their clients would present ethical quandaries for the non-lawyer
members of the MDP (#18, +3):
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If an MDP formed with a counselor and a lawyer,
the counselor could get referrals from the in-
house lawyer. But the problem is that in a
divorce case the lawyer would want the mental
health person to support one side-the firm's
position. This would compromise the
professional ethics of the mental health
professional.
Here the subjects seem to be extending their concern with ethics beyond
the individual attorney-client relationship to cover actions attorneys
might take that would damage that same client's relationship to other
professionals. In other words, to avoid temptation for professionals and
trouble for the client, Ethics Conservatives want all professions to
remain independent of one another. Embedded in concerns about ethics
are some derivative themes; Ethics Conservatives also focus on themes
hinting of ethical standards without dwelling primarily on them. One of
these is concern for the client, a subtext in many statements on core
values. 47 In these statements lawyers worry about the client being
deceived or suffering a disadvantage from an initial lack of objectivity
in the handling of a conflict of interest. 48 Ethics Conservatives also
bring in the client-centered issue of one-stop shopping, which relates
indirectly to MDP (having frequently been cited as a rationale for
adoption of MDPs). But they roundly dismiss the one-stop shopping
issue (#20, +5):
The idea that MDP is motivated by the desire to
promote one-stop shopping is just smoke.
This is not from disdain for consumers or consumerism; rather, they
argue that one-stop shopping would manipulate consumers rather than
benefit them (#8, +3):
One-stop shopping pressures the consumer.
Suddenly there's a referral; one's hand is
forced a little.
They further deny that MDP would provide economies of scale for the
middle class (#42, -4):
MDP could bring into existence some economies
of scale in legal services that would help
middle class people.
47. See, for example, the -3 response to statement #14. Supra p. 643 (discussing the score
and complete statement given).
48. In addition to statement #14, see also the discussion of statements #28 and #41. Supra
pp. 642, 643.
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b. Maintaining Control by Lawyers
Another concern related to core values is lawyers' desire to maintain
control. Fear of losing control is a subtext in #16 (+4), which bears
more directly on core values. Ethics Conservatives think that lawyers
should be concerned about becoming a minority in firms and, therefore,
becoming unable to exercise professional judgment regarding conflicts
of interest.49 But even if lawyers maintain voting control of a law firm,
it would be unacceptable for non-lawyers to own the firm (#11, -5):
I wouldn't have a problem with a corporation of
attorneys directed by and officered by
attorneys being owned in a nonvoting capacity
by a CPA firm.
50
c. Economic Concerns
In general, for Ethics Conservatives, concerns about macro-economic
trends, the future of the profession, where law firms are going, and the
accountancy Big Five5' play second fiddle to their central focus on
ethics. Interestingly, however, they do focus on legal careers, in which
they do not want accountants or MDPs involved. They show strongest
possible disagreement with propositions suggesting that adopting MDP
or dealing with the profession of accountancy would be good for law
careers or for creation of more work for lawyers (#47 and #49, both -5):
MDP contains no pitfalls for lawyers; it would
enhance most lawyers' careers. (47)
49. These attorneys might find reassurance in Edward L. Summers' 1999 survey of CPA and
attorney attitudes towards MDP. See Summers, supra note 43, at 7. His results showed that both
CPAs and attorneys believed legal services would take the lead over accounting services in MDPs
and, furthermore, that CPAs believed this more strongly than did attorneys. Id. As Summers
notes, his return rate was not high enough to permit generalization, but the trend he reports
suggests that attorneys might not need to fear losing control in MDPs. Id.
50. Moreover, control over the boundaries of the profession should not be sacrificed by
sharing lawyers' privilege with other professionals, not even on a case-by-case basis (#1, 0):
Staff in law firms now share in the lawyer's privilege;
other professionals in the law firm could come to share in
the privilege also. For instance, an accountant and
lawyer who work together on a client's problems should
both enjoy privilege.
And meanwhile, within the profession, internal controls on conflict of interest are important to
maintain (#31, + 1):
Attorneys from the same firm, even a very large firm, even
unacquainted, can meet and pool information; therein lays
[sic] the conflict of interest and the reason for
imputation.
51. The "Big Five" accounting and financial services firms are Arthur Andersen, Deloitte &
Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers.
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With accountancy firms involved in the law,
there would be more jobs for lawyers. (49)
Aside from these two statements, they put the economic facets of law
practice on the back burner, giving lower scores to such statements.
That they entertain some fear of economic trends is evident; MDP is
scary, because it would promote oligopoly in the law (#48, +3):
If MDP arrives, the big will get bigger, while
small and middle sized specialized accountants
and attorneys will get squeezed out.
Not even niche practices such as family law would be safe (#50, -3):
Family lawyers are in this little boutique area
where people hire them because they have
experience with the judges and custody issues.
MDP won't encroach on this type of practice.
Despite accountants' experience and success, 52 the assets they would
bring to any law firm they might acquire are not worthwhile, not
beneficial, and not welcome (#4, -3):
One of the things that the Big Five bring to
the table is an enormous amount of capital.
They can hire additional staff, and they can
provide economies of scale and efficiency.
There's some benefit to this.
Finally, MDP holds no advantages; neither small nor large firms would
benefit if it is permitted (#52, -2):
There would be advantages for a small firm to
be able to team up with someone else and be
able to provide more services to its clients.
But a large firm would also like MDP because
large firms are always trying to add practice
areas to service their clients.
52. Law firms are perceived as weaker than accountancy firms and thus liable to lose out in
competition (#23, +2):
If MDP is permitted, law firms would be unlikely to buy
out accountancy firms. The law firms don't have enough
money, and the legal mindset would also prevent it.
CPAs are tougher and more experienced in this competition (#38, +2):
The consolidators in the CPA profession are piranhas.
They come in and gobble up. They want you to work for a
pittance and tell you what to do.
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d. Regulation Issues
Ethics Conservatives are skeptical that regulation could safeguard
lawyers from these dangers. First, accountants are not going to accept
regulation willingly (#39, -4):
In acquiring law firms, accountants would
embrace regulation. Accountants are always
subject to regulation and are used to it; AICPA
rules are very strict.
Secondly, the ABA's proposal for regulation of MDPs is inadequate
(#33, +2):
The ABA proposal for regulating MDPs is just a
sop put in to make MDP more palatable.
More specifically, regulation would have to protect lawyers in an MDP
against unethical orders from non-lawyer superiors (#55, +3):
The MDP regulatory body would need to protect
the lawyer from his or her superiors; that
lawyer would need Supreme Court backup if there
were any interference with attorney judgment.
But would regulation do so? Would it work? This is problematic.53
e. View of Change
These attorneys are conservative in their attitude towards change as
well as in their thinking on professional ethics: they prefer the status
quo for reasons unrelated to ethics. They believe the MDP movement
can be stemmed (#36, +4):
If enough people stand up and say that MDP is
not inevitable, it won't be inevitable.
Hence, MDP is not inevitable (#34, -3):
This is going to happen. Whether it's going to
be this year, next year, or five years from
53. When considering possible sanctions, these attorneys seem to disagree that the sanction
should apply to the MDP as a unit, rather than to the attorney who works within it (#32, -2):
If the members of the MDP deliver legal services and
violate one of the rules, there would be a sanction-such
as the MDP losing the right to provide legal services.
Why would these subjects not agree to apply the sanction to the firm as a unit? From statement
#55, we know they want protection by regulation from non-lawyer bosses. Yet their rating of #32
suggests that if they want the support of a regulatory agency in ringing the bell on violations by
an MDP type of firm, they do not believe they would get it. The wording of #32 uses the
conditional form of the verb: ". . . there would be a sanction .... Ethics Conservatives may be
skeptical that sanctions would be applied, and much of the history of regulatory policy would
support such a cynical reading of the prospect for enforcement of such rules against large and
influential entities.
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now. It's just a question of when will
Missouri change its rules somewhat to allow
MDP.
Moreover, they see no need for a change (#5, +3):
I don't think the system is broken. I don't
really think it needs that big of a fix. I
think all the disciplines need to work
together. I'm not sure we all have to work in
the same office together.
The system of loose alliances and cross-referrals among professional
firms works better anyway54 (#13, +3):
A system of loose alliances among professional
firms is a lot more comfortable and less
constraining than MDPs.
Since there is no gain in value in a combination or MDP firm, Ethics
Conservatives deny the value of the one MDP explicitly mentioned in
the Q-sort: a lawyer, an accountant, and a financial planner would not
make a viable professional team (#22, -4):
A partnership with a lawyer, an accountant, and
a financial planner would work well.
It is possible, of course, that the articulated concern about the ethical
ramifications of an MDP is not, in fact, the only reason that members of
this group oppose the idea. They might be saying that they are trying to
protect the legal profession's "core values" when they are also
motivated by a disinclination to disrupt the status quo.
2. Type II: Eclectic MDP Enthusiasts
This grouping is eclectic in that it mixes ideas from many different
facets of the overall topic of MDP, and it is as supportive of MDP as
Type I is negative. Recall that these two types hold exactly opposite
views, and that the demographics of this type suggest a contrarian
posture on the issues of MDP. Table 6 displays the typal array, or
abstracted classic Q-sort, that reflects the views of the archetypal
Eclectic MDP Enthusiast.
54. Furthermore, they do not disagree that it is possible to serve clients now through such
means as sharing offices with other professionals (#46, +1):
MDP is not a rules change motivated by the desire to
provide better service to clients. It is possible to do
this now by sharing offices.
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Table 6. Typal Array of the Classic Eclectic MDP Enthusiast
Scores:
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5
26 16 9 17 18 43 35 6 52 39 34
3 26 21 55 2 37 32 47 11 19 24
20 8 46 48 40 7 45 14 22 1 4
38 41 10 33 25 50 53 42 29
5 36 54 27 44 49 12
13 51 15 23 30
31
a. View of Accountants
Among the ideas setting them apart from Ethics Conservatives is
admiration for accountants (#4, +5):
One of the things that the Big Five bring to
the table is an enormous amount of capital.
They can hire additional staff, and they can
provide economies of scale and efficiency.
There's some benefit to this.
They disagree with the negative characterization of accountants (#38,
-4):
The consolidators in the CPA profession are
piranhas. They come in and gobble up. They
want you to work for a pittance and tell you
what to do.
These lawyers have great respect for market forces, are outward looking
in various other ways and probably view market consolidators
positively. They also do not object to the idea of allowing non-voting
accountants to direct the operation of a law firm (#11, +3):
I wouldn't have a problem with a corporation of
attorneys directed by and officered by
attorneys being owned in a non-voting capacity
by a CPA firm.
Of course, since they support MDP, they also probably wouldn't mind a
law firm with accountants in a voting capacity.
b. Regulation Issues
Another issue integrated into their view is regulation. Besides their
favorable view of accountants' successful market activity, they also
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consider the accountancy profession highly regulated and, thus, a good
candidate for regulation under MDP (#39, +4):
In acquiring law firms, accountants would
embrace regulation. Accountants are always
subject to regulation and are used to it; AICPA
rules are very strict.
In several other statements, these attorneys show that they believe
regulation of MDPs could work.55 Contrastingly, they show disdain for
the legal profession's current lack of enforcement of its prohibitions on
UPL (#29, +4):
The Big Five accountancy firms have been using
lawyers for years; we have Unauthorized
Practice of Law (UPL) now. We ought to come
out into the open with it and let it be
regulated.
Since they think regulation is functioning poorly in the law and well in
accountancy, and they admire the profession of accountancy and favor
MDP, these lawyers believe regulation of MDP would result in more
regulation of lawyers practicing within accounting firms than is
currently the case.
c. Legal Ethics
Eclectic MDP Enthusiasts are concerned with the core values of the
legal profession, but less so than Ethics Conservatives. 56 Primarily, this
group shows a broad interpretation of core values, in contrast to the
Ethics Conservatives' strict interpretation. Thus, MDP Enthusiasts
55. With their view that regulation can work, and that it would work under MDP, they do not
accept cavalier dismissal of the ABA's regulatory plan (#33, -1):
The ABA proposal for regulating MDPs is just a sop put in
to make MDP more palatable.
Since regulation can and does work, MDPs would have to keep shipshape, or face the adverse
consequences (#32, +1):
If the members of the MDP deliver legal services and
violate one of the rules, there would be a sanction-such
as the MDP losing the right to provide legal services.
Because MDP regulation would work, lawyers would not need protection if they worked for an
MDP, so MDP Enthusiasts exempt the regulator from the obligation to be a guardian angel (#55,
-2):
The MDP regulatory body would need to protect the lawyer
from his or her superiors; that lawyer would need Supreme
Court backup if there were any interference with attorney
judgment.
56. Eclectic Enthusiasts had 7% fewer statements on core values among their top two scoring
categories than did Ethics Conservatives and about 9% fewer statements on core values in their
top three scoring categories than did Ethics Conservatives.
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most strongly disagree that core values require the profession to keep its
prohibitions (#26, -4):
The principal arguments for retaining such
prohibitions relate to concerns about the
profession's core values, specifically
professional independence of judgment, the
protection of confidential client information,
and loyalty to the client through the avoidance
of conflicts of interest.
On this point, MDP Enthusiasts are almost diametrically opposed to
conservatives, who assign this statement a +5. We see clearly the
bipolar features of these two factor types in this and in other contrasts.
This group also denies that MDP poses a confidentiality problem (#3,
-5):
There may not be a business problem with MDP
but there is a confidentiality problem. It
gets back to the hard ethical questions that
govern lawyers but not accountants or any of
the folks that we're talking about combining
with.
Furthermore, it defines conflict of interest narrowly, giving broad scope
to ethics calls involving conflict of interest (#24, +5):
If conflict of interest can be resolved in a
large law firm, it can be resolved in a merged
accountancy-law firm.
Going even further, MDP Enthusiasts deny that the legal profession's
definition of conflicts of interest would be in danger in an MDP firm,
even if the lawyers were outnumbered (#16, -4):
If lawyers would be in the minority in an MDP,
conflict of interest as lawyers see it could be
overruled.
They use a more liberal working definition of conflict of interest, in the
sense that they would more narrowly define situations that present
impermissible conflicts of interest. Thus, they vehemently disagree
with the following statement (#41, -3):
For the purposes of a conflict of interest
analysis, the lawyer would have to treat each
and every client of the MDP as his/her own
client.
57. The statistical probability of this outcome happening by chance is less than one in a
million. Many scoring differences in this study are of similar improbability.
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Moreover, they deny that professional mergers will necessarily cause
loss of objectivity (#28, -5):
Currently, if you have an attorney and an
accountant who are independent of each other,
the client has the advantage of having two
separate professionals, each looking over the
other's shoulder. You are going to lose that
by putting them both in one firm. Their
interest will be the same and you've lost the
objectivity that comes from having two
independent professionals.
With their respect for accountants and their broad understanding of core
values, it is not surprising that they believe that the attorney-client
privilege can be extended to protect legal advice discussed between the
client and professionals other than licensed attorneys 58 (#1, +4):
Staff in law firms now share in the lawyer's
privilege; other professionals in the law firm
could come to share in the privilege also. For
instance, an accountant and lawyer who work
together on a client's problems should both
enjoy privilege.
d. Consumer Issues
Another topic is the role of the consumer of legal services. Eclectic
MDP Enthusiasts are outward-looking here, too; they strongly support
the notion of one-stop shopping and strongly insist that this is an
important feature of a client-centered system of delivering legal services
(#20, -5):
The idea that MDP is motivated by the desire to
promote one-stop shopping is just smoke.
Further, they deny that one-stop service shopping contains an element
of coercion for consumers (#8, -4):
One-stop shopping pressures the consumer.
Suddenly there's a referral; one's hand is
forced a little.
58. Also, they do not see a lawyer putting pressure on a fellow professional as violating the
ethics of that particular field [in this instance psychology] (#18, -1):
If an MDP formed with a counselor and a lawyer, the
counselor could get referrals from the in-house lawyer.
But the problem is that in a divorce case the lawyer would
want the mental health person to support one side - the
firm's position. This would compromise the professional
ethics of the mental health professional.
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They also defend the notion of MDP as inspired by the desire to serve
clients better, disagreeing with a statement to the contrary (#46, -3):
MDP is not a rules change motivated by the
desire to provide better service to clients.
It is possible to do this now by sharing
offices.
In the following statement, they seem to believe that the public needs
safeguards, rather than thinking that the legal profession lacks the
ability to develop safeguards (#9, -3):
When firms get huge, the public needs
safeguards, but the legal profession is very
good at developing these safeguards.
They also deny, although less strenuously, another assertion regarding
one-stop shopping (#21, -3):
Most of the larger businesses have the opposite
of one-stop shopping: instead of wanting all
services from one provider, they are splitting
up their legal work among several law firms.
This response indicates a disagreement regarding the prevalence of the
need for one-stop shopping, which may be illuminated by further
empirical investigation. These were the only statements on one-stop
shopping in the Q-sort; by inadvertence, each was phrased negatively.
Eclectic MDP Enthusiasts took issue with each statement; they are
"sold" on the idea of one-stop shopping.
e. Economic Concerns
The economic benefits of MDP are an important theme for MDP
Enthusiasts whose interest seems entrepreneurial and marketing-
oriented. Thus, members of this group felt that a small firm could
benefit if MDPs were allowed (#22, +3):
A partnership with a lawyer, an accountant, and
a financial planner would work well.
But a large firm could also reap benefits from MDP if it allied with or
were absorbed by a particularly well-known company (#19, +4):
Publicly-held clients would accept consolidated
service providers easily because they would
feel comfortable getting service from a
provider with a well-known trademark name.
All kinds of law firms would realize benefits (#52, +3):
There would be advantages for a small firm to
be able to team up with someone else and be
able to provide more services to its clients.
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But a large firm would also like MDP because
large firms are always trying to add practice
areas to service their clients.
The consolidations, acquisitions and buyouts necessary to accomplish
this economic regrouping are accepted with equanimity (#11, +3):
I wouldn't have a problem with a corporation of
attorneys directed by and officered by
attorneys being owned in a non-voting capacity
by a CPA firm.
The benefits would spread beyond the legal profession to help the
potential clients in under-served populations (#42, +3):
MDP could bring into existence some economies
of scale in legal services that would help
middle class people.
One specific way the general population could benefit is if it were made
easier to make out a will (#6, +2):
By most estimates more than half the adults in
the United States don't have a will. What if
an individual's financial advisor could pair
with a lawyer to provide this service? That
individual could get advice on how to invest
for retirement and then step down the hall to
work with a lawyer on a will.
Change will come about anyway and is inevitable. In other words, this
group feels there is no resisting this change, no matter how determined
lawyers might be to prevent it (#36, -2):
If enough people stand up and say that MDP is
not inevitable, it won't be inevitable.
In a number of other ways these subjects see the changes they believe
are happening as acceptable, and non-threatening. 59 Given their good
59. Creating new markets and generating new business would boost life and work for lawyers
(#47, +2):
MDP contains no pitfalls for lawyers; it would enhance
most lawyers' careers.
Not just better working conditions, but better employment opportunities would be available (#49,
+2):
With accountancy firms involved in the law, there would be
more jobs for lawyers.
Some statements portrayed changes as threatening, but adherents of this view dismiss such
doomsaying (#48, -2):
If MDP arrives, the big will get bigger, while small and
middle sized specialized accountants and attorneys will
get squeezed out.
Trial lawyers would not be isolated under MDP (#40, - 1):
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opinion of the potential benefits of MDP, these people actively favor
adoption of MDP, and think it likely as well (#34, +5):
This is going to happen. Whether it's going to
be this year, next year, or five years from
now. It's just a question of when will
Missouri change its rules somewhat to allow
MDP.
The members of this group tend to hold a series of iconoclastic views.
They focus more on the business of delivering legal services to clients
and are less concerned than Ethics Conservatives about the potential
threat to the legal profession's core values that MDPs may present.
3. Type III: Liberals
Whereas Types I and II are inversely related to each other (i.e.,
approximately reversed in their thinking), Type III's approach to MDP
is nearly unrelated to Type I's outlook. 6° In practical terms, this means
that Type III's viewpoint sets out on a different course than Type I's
typal array. Type III represents a viewpoint completely distinct from
that shared by the members of the Type I group. In the language of
factor analysis, Type III would be considered "orthogonal" to, or
"independent" of, Type I. Table 7 gives the typal array, or archetypal
Q-sort, which would reflect the views of a classic Liberal.
Adoption of MDP will make boutiques out of trial lawyers;
it will become like the division in the United Kingdom
between barristers and solicitors.
But some practice areas, such as family law, might be more sheltered from change (#50, +1):
Family lawyers are in this little boutique area where
people hire them because they have experience with the
judges and custody issues. MDP won't encroach on this
type of practice.
However, not all changes would be rosy; without reference to any MDP firm, this view does not
disagree with the difficulties lawyers can encounter working for non-lawyers (#30, +2)
When a member of the bar works for a non-law firm, you're
not an attorney, you're an employee with legal skills.
They disagree with this statement contending nothing is wrong with the status quo (#5, -3):
I don't think the system is broken. I don't really think
it needs that big of a fix. I think all the disciplines
need to work together. I'm not sure we all have to work
in the same office together.
60. The correlation coefficient between Types III and I is -. 17, while that between Types III
and II is +.40. But Types I and II have a high correlation of -. 77, indicating their degree of
polarization.
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Table 7. Typal Array of the Classic Liberal
Scores:
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5
33 36 11 51 23 10 7 24 3 12 26
47 20 49 9 27 13 35 41 4 1 14
2 30 16 37 45 48 25 22 6 52 55
38 39 50 54 44 42 32 19 34
43 46 31 5 18 53 29
8 15 17 40 21
28
a. Legal Ethics
The Liberal view sets out from the same premise of core values as do
Ethics Conservatives (#26, +5):
The principal arguments for retaining such
prohibitions relate to concerns about the
profession's core values, specifically
professional independence of judgment, the
protection of confidential client information,
and loyalty to the client through the avoidance
of conflicts of interest.
Then, those holding the Liberal view take a somewhat different stand
regarding conflicts of interest. As they see it, the key question is
whether or not a conflict exists, rather than the scope of that conflict
(#2, -5):
Conflict of interest is based not just on the
existence of a conflict but on the volume of
that interest.
This view maintains that tough stand in considering conflict of interest
problems in potential MDPs (#41, +2):
For the purposes of a conflict of interest
analysis, the lawyer would have to treat each
and every client of the MDP as his/her own
client.
At this point, Liberals diverge and define core values very differently by
holding that even if a conflict of interest exists, it may be avoidable or
waivable (#14, +5):
The key way to avoid conflict of interest is to
make a disclosure to the client: does the
client want the relationship to continue
despite this?
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This view is in sharp contrast to Ethics Conservatives (who assign a -3
to #14). This difference of opinion over whether or not disclosure and
client waiver are ethically sufficient in handling conflict of interest
problems may be the crux of one element of the MDP controversy.
Liberals extrapolate from a general view that since conflicts of interest
can be and are habitually resolved, conflicts of interest could be
resolved easily in an MDP (#24, +2):
If conflict of interest can be resolved in a
large law firm, it can be resolved in a merged
accountancy-law firm.
Here, they use the large law firm as a model. Moreover, in contrast to
Ethics Conservatives, Liberals would be willing to extend the protection
of the attorney-client privilege to clients' communications with
members of other professions (#1, +4):
Staff in law firms now share in the lawyer's
privilege; other professionals in the law firm
could come to share in the privilege also. For
instance, an accountant and lawyer who work
together on a client's problems should both
enjoy privilege.
With their positive stance on collaboration among professionals,
Liberals do not mind the prospect of other professionals at the helm of
their firms, and thus do not see how this would interfere with attorneys'
calls on conflicts of interest problems (#16, -3):
If lawyers would be in the minority in an MDP,
conflict of interest as lawyers see it could be
overruled.
Like Ethics Conservatives, Liberals are quite pre-occupied with core
values, conflicts of interests and maintenance of professional
ethics-but they take different positions. Although they depart from the
same first premises as Ethics Conservatives, they then narrow their
definition of conflict of interest by transplanting a liberal concept of
client waivers and, thereby, proceed to a permissive view.
b. View of Accountants
In particular, Liberals see accountants completely differently than do
those who oppose MDPs. In contrast to Ethics Conservatives'
agreement with statement #38, Liberals strongly reject the negative
characterization of CPAs as consolidators (#38, -4):
The consolidators in the CPA profession are
piranhas. They come in and gobble up. They
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want you to work for a pittance and tell you
what to do.
Liberals, however, are not completely unwary of Big Five accounting
firms. For example, they acknowledge the existence of UPL in the Big
Five, and would like to have better regulation of lawyers now practicing
within CPA firms, a view in line with their general commitment to
openness (#29, +3):
The Big Five accountancy firms have been using
lawyers for years; we have Unauthorized
Practice of Law (UPL) now. We ought to come
out into the open with it and let it be
regulated.
Nor do they see MDP as a solution for excess capacity in the legal labor
market (#49, -3):
With accountancy firms involved in the law,
there would be more jobs for lawyers.
Indeed, they are slightly suspicious that accountants would be less than
fully willing to submit to regulation, 6 hence their disagreement with
this proposition (#39, -2):
In acquiring law firms, accountants would
embrace regulation. Accountants are always
subject to regulation and are used to it; AICPA
rules are very strict.
Significantly, despite their realistic reservations, Liberals would be
willing to share the lawyer's privilege with accountants and other
professionals (#1, +4). They view the legal profession as able to hold
its own with other professions; they do not think that lawyers would be
transformed into minions or reduced to menial ranks (#30, -4):
When a member of the bar works for a non-law
firm, you're not an attorney, you're an
employee with legal skills.
This may be tied to Liberals' rejection of the caricature of CPA
consolidators as "Scrooges" bent on reducing lawyers' incomes and
61. Collaboration with other professionals is not ethically distasteful; liberals are indifferent to
whether cooperative efforts among professionals would jeopardize professional objectivity (#28,
0):
Currently, if you have an attorney and an accountant who
are independent of each other, the client has the
advantage of having two separate professionals, each
looking over the other's shoulder. You are going to lose
that by putting them both in one firm. Their interest
will be the same and you've lost the objectivity that
comes from having two independent professionals.
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forcing them to do as they are told (#38, -4). For them, lawyers are
strong and can compete openly with the other professions without need
of barricades or fences.
c. Consumer Issues
One-stop shopping, the concept of the service superstore, has only a
minor role in Liberals' views. They see one-stop shopping as a true and
sincere motivation behind the MDP movement, and deny the argument
that it is a manipulative public relations ruse (#20, -4):
The idea that MDP is motivated by the desire to
promote one-stop shopping is just smoke.
Consistent with their support for professionals working together,
Liberals are indifferent to the idea that service superstores coerce the
client (#8, -2):
One-stop shopping pressures the consumer.
Suddenly there's a referral; one's hand is
forced a little.
This grouping is less concerned about other statements involving
consumer ideology. 62
62. But another statement that might have become prominent in liberals' thinking on one-stop
shopping fades instead into only the mildest agreement (within the zone of indifference) (#44, 0):
Often, clients must bounce from office to office, and
those professionals in the various disciplines have to
adjust and readjust to members of the team the client has
already selected.
Liberals have possibly not, as lawyers, had to face the adjustments and readjustments to which
this proposition attests; conceivably, lawyers are dominant when clients do rounds of
professionals and, therefore, adjust less than other professionals (e.g., accountants, financial
planners). It is also possible that Liberals are more accustomed to dealing with business clients
than with individual clients, so that they are less exposed to clients who might be complaining
about the roundrobin visits back and forth. But might Liberals then be more familiar with the
problems of pooling professional services in transactional law? The managing partner of a major
firm (in a metropolitan area) contributed the next comment. Its subtext is that business clients
don't necessarily want one-stop shopping and have indeed now advanced beyond this stage. But
liberals are not attuned to this market development (#21, +2):
Most of the larger businesses have the opposite of one-
stop shopping: instead of wanting all services from one
provider, they are splitting up their legal work among
several law firms.
Conceivably the difficulty of marketing legal services dawns most on managing partners, less on
the partners and associates providing client services.
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d. View of Change
Liberals view MDP as inevitable, but want to control the process and
time sequence of phasing in rules changes leading to the formation of
MDP (#12, +4):
Big groups with money can push MDP and nobody's
going to have the money to really keep it from
happening. The real question is: If it's going
to happen, can it be done in a controlled way
that will lead to the best outcome for the
consumer as well as being realistic for the
professionals?
Liberals' attitude toward change63 is progressive: they embrace change
and expect MDP to win out sooner or later (#34, +4):
This is going to happen. Whether it's going to
be this year, next year, or five years from
now. It's just a question of when will
Missouri change its rules somewhat to allow
MDP.
They dismiss the argument that the Bar can hold out against MDP (#36,
-4):
If enough people stand up and say that MDP is
not inevitable, it won't be inevitable.
Liberals are indifferent to one statement that gently defends the status
quo (#5, 0):
I don't think the system is broken. I don't
really think it needs that big of a fix. I
think all the disciplines need to work
together. I'm not sure we all have to work in
the same office together.
They are anxious to reposition law practice, and all sizes of law firms,
to work the market for legal services better (#52, +4):
There would be advantages for a small firm to
be able to team up with someone else and be
able to provide more services to its clients.
But a large firm would also like MDP because
63. In the back of their minds, Liberals view the status quo as a sort of "restraint of trade," a
set of guild rules limiting professional activity (#35, +1):
I don't think it's a question of whether you need to fix
something. I think the question is, do you need to
inhibit something? Do you need to restrict something?
We're talking about a restraint on activities and whether
the restraint should be there or not.
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large firms are always trying to add practice
areas to service their clients.
For larger firms, MDP would help by permitting repackaging law firms
under renowned brand names guaranteeing quality (#19, +3):
Publicly-held clients would accept consolidated
service providers easily because they would
feel comfortable getting service from a
provider with a well-known trademark name.
Meanwhile, smaller firms64 would do better if more estate practice
could be generated (#6, +3):
By most estimates more than half the adults in
the United States don't have a will. What if
an individual's financial advisor could pair
with a lawyer to provide this service? That
individual could get advice on how to invest
for retirement and then step down the hall to
work with a lawyer on a will.
The accountants would bring to the practice of law ingredients helpful
to lawyers-cash and business acumen (#4, +3):
One of the things that the Big Five bring to
the table is an enormous amount of capital.
They can hire additional staff, and they can
provide economies of scale and efficiency.
There's some benefit to this.
With their overall orientation towards marketing of legal services and
advancing towards new ways of delivering those services, Liberals are
concerned with serving clients-and they see client service as more
than just convenient office location. Thus, they deny this next assertion
(#46, -2):
MDP is not a rules change motivated by the
desire to provide better service to clients.
It is possible to do this now by sharing
offices.
However, Liberals do not believe the road ahead is completely easy.
Instead, they feel that MDP presents problems for lawyers (#47, -5):
MDP contains no pitfalls for lawyers; it would
enhance most lawyers' careers.
64. For smaller firms, (#22, +2):
A partnership with a lawyer, an accountant, and a
financial planner would work well.
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e. Regulation Issues
The issue of professional regulation also concerns Liberals, who
defend the regulation proposal by the ABA's MDP Commission,
strenuously denying that it is only a ploy to put MDP over on the
profession (#33, -5):
The ABA proposal for regulating MDPs is just a
sop put in to make MDP more palatable.
They would want the MDP regulator to have power to reach within an
MDP firm to protect lawyers who might face overbearing bosses
lacking respect for legal ethics (#55, +5):
The MDP regulatory body would need to protect
the lawyer from his or her superiors; that
lawyer would need Supreme Court backup if there
were any interference with attorney judgment.
Furthermore, regulation of MDPs should be tough enough to disqualify
any MDP found not playing by the rules (#32, +2):
If the members of the MDP deliver legal
services and violate one of the rules, there
would be a sanction-such as the MDP losing the
right to provide legal services.
Liberals disagree that current regulation of the legal profession is
ineffective and do not see the need to make it stricter (#43, -3):
No lawyers are now audited for misconduct;
someone should be looking at things more
closely. The lawyer disciplinary process
should be more proactive.
They do, however, acknowledge that lawyers in accountancy firms and
banks may engage in UPL without fear of discipline. But rather than
calling for more enforcement (or total enforcement) of rules against
UPL, Liberals relate this anomaly to the need for MDP, which would
acknowledge and regulate it, as contrasted to the status quo, in which
such UPL largely eludes detection or regulation (#29, +3):
The Big Five accountancy firms have been using
lawyers for years; we have Unauthorized
Practice of Law (UPL) now. We ought to come
out into the open with it and let it be
regulated.
This goes on also in banks (#53, +2):
Law officers of banks do give contracts to bank
customers and people do sign them without going
to see an independent attorney. They trust the
bank, and they don't have an attorney.
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Liberals are indifferent, however, to one way of avoiding difficulties
under MDP-the notion of charging a high fee to firms that want to
adopt an MDP form (#17, 0):
An expensive annual fee in connection with
doing MDP would limit MDP to the big boys: only
the megabanks and financially driven
accountancy firms could afford such a cost.
Possibly it is too early in the MDP debate for them to want to focus on
such specifics.
Liberals' view blends the dedication to core values and traditions of
the law so palpable in Ethics Conservatives with attunement to the
economic realities stirring and affecting the practice of law. Liberals
do, however, differ on some crucial definitions of core values and are
much more permissive than Ethics Conservatives. This is most notable
where Liberals accept a narrower definition of conflict of interest, so
that conflict problems can be more readily resolved in favor of taking a
case and working with a client, and in their willingness to share the
lawyer's privilege with other collaborating professionals. With this
approach, Liberals can embrace MDP as not threatening to their
conception of core values. Their openness to the other professions and
to the one-stop shopping ideology and their acceptance of change are
key motifs in their outlook. If Ethics Conservatives are the
traditionalists of the law, and MDP Enthusiasts are post-modern,
Liberals are somewhere in between traditional and post-modem. This is
where they place on the arc of opinion, and it is an apt characterization
of view of MDP.
IV. ANALYSIS
Exploration of patterns of consensus among the three Types
discovered in the Q-sort shows that Types II and III have many more
points (propositions) in common, while neither Types II nor III have
many points in common with Type I. Type I thus stands off by itself
more, and even though Types II and III are clearly separate with
distinctive agendas, these last two Types are more likely to discover
agreement between them on many issues of MDP. In contrast, Type I
has so few areas in common with Types II and III that discussion of
each issue may be the only way to work out agreement, since so few
areas of agreement occur naturally. Type I represents traditionalism,
while Types II and III represent reform and revitalization. Despite
disagreement between Types II and III that may become more evident
over time as the impetus for reform declines, for purposes of the debate
over MDP issues, Types II and III may often sound quite similar.
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A. Searching for Consensus
One reason the Missouri Bar commissioned this study was to explore
potential areas of agreement among attorneys. Any common ground
among them can furnish a basis for discussions, negotiations and
compromises. Therefore, shifting from a focus on the particular opinion
mixes of each Type, this Article will now turn to areas of consensus
among the Types.
One way to determine whether consensus exists is to look at the
particular Q-statements to which Types assign similar scores. Here the
Types not only agree (or disagree) with that statement, but go further,
also giving it the same level of importance in their viewpoints. Out of
all the possible scoring combinations of statements, the people in that
subset of two Types independently choose to assign the same, or nearly
the same, score to the same item. Finding such statements is
particularly significant when they are central in both Types' ways of
thinking (i.e., in the scoring range of 3 to 5), because a strong common
belief in a particular proposition can often help two otherwise opposed
groups begin serious discussion, or solidify an otherwise elusive
agreement.
With three Types, we have three pairs of Types: I with II, I with III,
and II with III. We also have the combination of all three Types. Our
measure is the difference in scores the two Types give each statement
(when considering all three Types, we use a three-way contrast of the
three scores). We ran a statistical test to determine whether the scoring
difference is statistically significant or not. If the difference is not
significant at the .05 level (i.e., if there is less than one chance in twenty
that the two (or three) scores are truly different), we consider the
statement to be a "consensus" statement.
Table 8 illustrates the extent to which consensus exists between each
pair of Types (and among all three Types). If we consider only the
number of statements reaching consensus status, pairing Types II and III
shows the highest possibilities for consensus: 38% of the 55 statements
show statistically identical scores as between the two Types. Neither of
the other pairs comes close: Types I and III, even though adjacent on
the arc of opinion, only reach consensus on 14.5% of the statements,
and Types I and II, clearly opposite in so many ways, attain consensus
on only 10.9% of the statements. Looking for consensus among all
three Types seems practically futile: only 3.6% of the statements (2 out
of 55) elicit consensual reactions from all three Types.
We can also look at magnitude of scores. Higher statement scores
signify that the two (or three) Types agree on a cardinal issue in their
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thinking, while lower statement scores signify they agree on matters to
which they are relatively indifferent. The statements on which Types I
and III reach consensus show the highest average score (2.29 out of 5),
and the statements on which Types II and III agree also have a high
average (1.58). In contrast, Types I and II come to consensus largely on
statements to which they assign low scores: .44 means an average score
lower than +1 or -1 (i.e., in the zero range).65 The average score for
consensus statements across all Types is only a little higher, at .54.66
The best place to look for consensus is where it flourishes: between
Types I and III, and between Types II and III. We canvass other
consensus possibilities, but without high expectations.
Table 8. Consensus Possibilities of Paired Types and All Types
All Types: Types I & II Types I & III Types II & III
Number of
Consensus 3.6% 10.9% 14.5% 38.0%
Statements (2) (6) (8) (21)
Between/
Among
Types:
Average
Score of .54 .44 2.29 1.58
Consensus
Statements
In presenting these statements, scores assigned by each of the two (or
three) Types in a comparison are given in parentheses after the
statement itself. The scores are in order of Types (i.e., Type I's score
first, if it is in the comparison; Type II's score second, unless Type I is
not in the comparison, in which case Type II's score is first, etc.). In
contrasts involving all three Types, when a significant statistical
difference separates the scores of one or two pairs of the Types, that
information is given after the Types' scores, also in parentheses. Note
also that some statements on which two Types share consensus also
65. Recall that the Q-sort permitted scores as high as +5 or as low as -5.
66. The average differences between Type II and III's scores on consensus statements and
those between Type I and II are significant (p<.001), and the difference between the average
scores of Type I and III's consensus statements and those of Type I and II is also significant
(p<.O I), but no other contrasts reach statistical significance.
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attract the third Type for a three-Type consensus, a particularly probable
situation when both Types assign the statement a low score. When
statements recur in this way, the commentary makes note.
B. Consensus between Types H and III
The largest area of consensus between any pair of Types is between
Types II and III. More than a third of the statements in the Q-sort67
elicit similar reactions-scores in the same range-from the members
of these two groups. 68 Many such scores are high and when this is so,
the corresponding statements are central propositions in the viewpoints.
Since many of the statements are consensual, the discussion is
organized around statement themes.
1. Consumerism
A key issue surrounding MDP is its potential effect on the way in
which many types of professional services will be marketed and
delivered to clients as consumers. Types II and III are in general
agreement on how MDP will affect consumers, and they believe that
consumers both want and deserve MDP. The most consensual
statement between this pair of Types is statement #20:
The idea that MDP is motivated by the desire to
promote one-stop shopping is just smoke. (-5,
-4)69
Their joint rejection of this critique of the consumerist and altruistic
base of the MDP movement goes to show that both Liberals and MDP
Enthusiasts genuinely believe the one-stop shopping argument for
MDP; they deny the insinuation that it is a sophistic maneuver reflecting
a hidden agenda. Seeing MDP as at least partially a program to deliver
better service to clients, they disagree with statement #46:
MDP is not a rules change motivated by the
desire to provide better service to clients.
It is possible to do this now by sharing
offices. (-3, -2)
67. N=21, =38%.
68. Another way of putting this is that these two types assigned scores that were not
significantly different (in a statistical sense, i.e., p>.05) to 21 statements, but assigned scores that
were significantly different (in a statistical sense, i.e., p<.05) to the remaining 34 statements.
69. As discussed, the Analysis Section of this Article is focussed on comparing the three
Types. Consequently, when specific statements are examined, there will be at least two different
scores for that statement. These scores are indicated after the statement is given. When these
scores are given they will be in numeric order according to the Types being discussed. For
example, if Type I scored a question -4, and Type II scored a question as +3, the score would be
given after the statement as: (-4, +3).
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Sharing offices is insufficient to establish one-stop shopping, it
wouldn't go far enough to do the job. When Ethics Conservatives argue
that MDP has no relation to consumer desires and is only really wanted
by some segments in the bar-and Ethics Conservatives are tempted to
argue along these lines, for they agree with #20 with a resounding
+5-their arguments probably will go nowhere when Liberals and/or
MDP Enthusiasts are present in good numbers for the debate. This is an
issue central to all three views, yet polarizing one from the other two.
Of course, if MDP Enthusiasts and Liberals try to defend the
consumerist base of the MDP issue, they similarly will get nowhere
when Ethics Conservatives are around.7°
2. Markets for Legal Services
Another area of consensus concerns the market for professional
services. Types II and III see it as seamless; they do not focus only on
the market segment for legal services, but rather see that market
segment as closely interrelated to the overall market for accountancy,
financial planning, etc. We see this in their attitude toward accountants.
Rejection of statement #38 is central to both Types:
The consolidators in the CPA profession are
piranhas. They come in and gobble up. They
want you to work for a pittance and tell you
what to do. (-4, -4)
Why do they reject the negative characterization of accountants? Given
their respect for market forces, they probably respect the accountancy
profession's growth and development. (Note that this issue also divides
Types II and III from the Ethics Conservatives, who are in mild
agreement with statement #38, giving it a score of +2.) Since both
Types favor lawyers' expansion of their marketing advantage, they can
also see merit in forming MDP firms, and they further believe that law
firms of all sizes can benefit, as seen in their reactions to statement #52:
There would be advantages for a small firm to
be able to team up with someone else and be
able to provide more services to its clients.
But a large firm would also like MDP because
70. MDP Enthusiasts and Liberals are, however, less worried about the physical aspect of
client convenience, or about the time consumed by professionals getting up to speed on the
client's situation, as seen in their indifferent agreement with statement #44:
Often, clients must bounce from office to office, and
those professionals in the various disciplines have to
adjust and readjust to members of the team the client has
already selected. (1, 0)
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large firms are always trying to add practice
areas to service their clients. (3, 4)
It is noteworthy that Type I rejects #52 with a -2, indicating a
substantial difference of opinion between Ethics Conservatives and
members of the other two groups on this issue. Types II and III also
agree on the economic and marketing advantage of consolidating legal
services with a better-known entity, as seen in their reactions to
statement #19:
Publicly-held clients would accept consolidated
service providers easily because they would
feel comfortable getting service from a
provider with a well-known trademark name. (4,
3)
Their interest in cross-professional mergers explains the appeal of a
merged law and financial planning firm in statement #6:
By most estimates more than half the adults in
the United States don't have a will. What if
an individual's financial advisor could pair
with a lawyer to provide this service? That
individual could get advice on how to invest
for retirement and then step down the hall to
work with a lawyer on a will. (2, 3)
Their focus on marketing legal services continues with additional
consensus statements of less centrality to their views.71
71. Types II and III also agree on other economic matters, centering mainly on the valuation
of firms in cases of potential buyout. They react similarly to statement #51 (which is nearly
consensual among all three types) :
In buying professional practices, outside firms look for
an annuity practice-an assured annual income. But most
law firms don't have this. (-1, -2)
Ironically, this comment was offered by an accountant-it is an accountancy analysis of law firm
value! Despite their ecumenism with accountants, Type II and III mildly deny this putdown.
They react similarly also to statement #27 (which is nearly consensual among all three types):
Some large law firms see MDP as a way of saving their
practice; it is a godsend. These firms anticipate being
bought out. (0, -1)
This comment, from a managing partner in a large litigation firm, is mildly rejected. It conveys a
picture of economic troubles for large law firms on the horizon, but lawyers don't find that the
observation has much relevance. They also agree on statement #54 (which is nearly consensual
among all three types):
Law firms would be very tempted by an acquisition, whether
by another law firm or an accountancy firm. For senior
partners, it boils down to a question of who is going to
pay me my money? (-1, -1)
Again, despite Type II and III's focus on marketing and economics, this statement is too detailed
to capture their interest, and they mildly reject it. Finally, they agree also on statement #25:
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3. Views Regarding Lawyers Working with Other Professionals
Types II and III also agree with liberalization in the usage of
privilege, seeing the benefit of sharing it with other professionals such
as accountants, etc., in statement #1:
Staff in law firms now share in the lawyer's
privilege; other professionals in the law firm
could come to share in the privilege also. For
instance, an accountant and lawyer who work
together on a client's problems should both
enjoy privilege. (4, 4)
Extending the attorney-client privilege to protect client communications
with members of other professions would go a long way towards
making MDP feasible, since the clients' confidential information
revealed to his or her attorney would remain protected even if members
of other professions were brought in on a team workup of the clients'
problems. Again, both Types are open to other professionals'
involvement, defend other professionals and are willing to share the
attorney-client privilege with them. Furthermore, both Types like many
of the ideas behind MDP. In contrast, Type I rejects statement #1 with
a - 1. While this opinion is neither central nor polarized, it is still quite
far from where MDP Enthusiasts and Liberals come down. Types II
and III may also be defending large firms, as seen in their reaction to
statement #9 (a three-way consensual statement):
When firms get huge, the public needs
safeguards, but the legal profession is very
good at developing these safeguards. (-3, -2)
We can't say conclusively that they are standing up for large firms;
since the statement is double-barreled, they may be saying that the legal
profession is not very good at coming up with safeguards. Their denial
of statement #16:
If lawyers would be in the minority in an MDP,
conflict of interest as lawyers see it could be
overruled. (-4, -3)
suggests that they see little peril for lawyers in MDP because they see
the legal profession as strong and able to hold out against cross-
pressures. In their view, lawyers would not be forced to adopt the other
professions' definitions of a conflict of interest, even if the members of
Many accountancy firms would buy out law firms quickly if
the rules of legal practice were liberalized. (0, 1)
Types 11 and III do not focus on buyouts of law firms at all. They are interested in law firm
growth through expansion and merger more than in acquisitions of passive law firms and the
particulars of pricing and of who profits.
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the other professions made up the majority of the firm. Participants
who belong to Types II and III anticipate that lawyers in an MDP would
be able to insist that the MDP treat conflicts of interest in a manner
consistent with the norms of the legal profession.72
4. Need for Change
Another noteworthy area of agreement is on whether MDP will
happen or can be resisted. Members of both Type II and III see MDP as
inevitable, as shown by their common disagreement with statement #36:
If enough people stand up and say that MDP is
not inevitable, it won't be inevitable. (-2,
-4)
The 19th century French author Victor Hugo once wrote, "[G]reater
than the tread of mighty armies is an idea whose time has come." 73
Members of these two groups view MDP as an idea whose time has
come. Originally contributed by a managing partner of a litigation firm,
the statement actually asserts the exact opposite-that one can
successfully resist an idea whose time has supposedly come, and Type I,
the Ethics Conservative, strongly agrees that the tide of change can be
resisted (+4).
5. Concerns about UPL
Type II and Type III attorneys both prefer to tolerate activities that
technically violate UPL prohibitions, rather than to seek full
enforcement of UPL rules. This can be seen in their agreement with
statement #29:
The Big Five accountancy firms have been using
lawyers for years; we have Unauthorized
Practice of Law (UPL) now. We ought to come
out into the open with it and let it be
regulated. (4, 3)
72. We see this view of law firms as strong also in the downplaying of acquisitions of law
firms and in the view that law firm prices are not threatened (see previous footnote). Another
statement of consensus in this vein is #31 (which is nearly consensual among all three types):
Attorneys from the same firm, even a very large firm, even
unacquainted, can meet and pool information; therein lays
[sic] the conflict of interest and the reason for
imputation. (0, -1)
Types H and 1I aren't worried much about conflict of interest in a large firm, or with whether the
need for imputation is as crucial there.
73. VICTOR HUGO, HISTOIRE D'UN CRIME, Conclusion (1859). The usual English translation
takes some liberties with the original French, which can be translated more literally as "you can
withstand invading armies, but you can't withstand invading ideas."
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Despite little concern about current UPL in the Big Five, lawyers are
interested enough in rules to want to make them effective in MDPs.
They believe that the regulations governing MDPs should have teeth, as
seen in their acceptance of statement #32:
If the members of the MDP deliver legal
services and violate one of the rules, there
would be a sanction-such as the MDP losing the
right to provide legal services. (1, 2)
Types II and III may feel that current UPL rules have outlived their
usefulness. One situation in which they see current UPL rules as
prohibiting conduct that should be permissible is that encountered by
attorneys employed by banks who give some advice to the banks'
customers. This is shown in statement #53, which is nearly consensual
among all three Types:
Law officers of banks do give contracts to bank
customers and people do sign them without going
to see an independent attorney. They trust the
bank, and they don't have an attorney. (2, 2)
They think some kind of UPL, in letter or in spirit, is occurring, but
aren't concerned; they are willing to tolerate this deviation, especially
given the trust of the bank's customer.74
C. Consensus Between Types I and III
Types I and III are neighbors on the arc of opinion, but share a
smaller area of agreement than Types II and III. Only eight statements
do not differentiate significantly between these two Types, and only
three of the eight are central to their views. These are reviewed here.
The five statements that elicited relative neutrality from the respondents
who placed them in the middle of their sorts, are identified along with
their scores but not interpreted.
Types I and III both strongly reject Statement #47:
MDP contains no pitfalls for lawyers; it would
enhance most lawyers' careers. (-5, -5)
74. Another statement that attracts consensual response is #15, which expresses an irony about
the rules now and what the rules might be under MDP:
Paying an ambulance driver for a referral to a medical
malpractice case is a moral outrage; but under MDP, it
would not be a moral outrage to pay a financial planner
for a referral to draw up a will. (0, -1)
Types II and II1 want new rules, believe the old rules may be outdated and unenforceable, so the
moral contrast doesn't bother them: it will be resolved satisfactorily through the renewal process
that will include new realistic UPL rules.
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A Big Five accountant originally made this statement, and lawyers in
these two schools of thought vehemently disagree with it. The Ethics
Conservatives (Type I) disagree out of preference for fencing the law
off from other professions, out of concern for core values, and because
they prefer the status quo. Liberals (Type III) who want change are
nonetheless wary about the dangers of MDP and prefer to proceed
cautiously. Ethics Conservatives also might find gradual change
preferable to any precipitous action (even though their true preference is
for no change at all). Avoiding the pitfalls of MDP is one bridge-a
bridge involving caution about change-between these two otherwise
divergent views.75 Although it is less central to their points of view,
both Types also reject the model of proactive prosecution of lawyer
misconduct, as seen in their response to statement #43:
No lawyers are now audited for misconduct;
someone should be looking at things more
closely. The lawyer disciplinary process
should be more proactive. (-2, -3)
Certainly the participants in these groups reject the idea of stepping up
enforcement of professional responsibility regulations, including the
enforcement of UPL regulations against out-of-state lawyers. All
Types' responses to #53 indicate that they are not eager to increase the
enforcement of sanctions against bank lawyers who give legal advice to
bank customers (statement #53, 1, 2, 2). So another policy theme that
might find great support along the upper right quadrant of the arc of
opinion is sidestepping tough UPL rules enforcement as a means of
dealing with the MDP challenge. 76 Lastly, statement #9 also draws out
agreement between Types I and III:
75. A specific pitfall of MDP to which these Types are consensually indifferent is the threat
that MDP is needed to save the financial status of large law firms. A specific potential danger of
MDP dismissed by both of these Types is the idea that MDP is needed to enhance the financial
strength of large law firms. It is noteworthy that reaction to statement #27 is consensual among
all three types:
Some large law firms see MDP as a way of saving their
practice; it is a godsend. These firms anticipate being
bought out. (-1, -1)
The large law firms are so prosperous, pay such high salaries, that lawyers may find extravagant
the proposition that their financial status is in any jeopardy. Both types also dismiss another
specific pitfall with statement #40:
Adoption of MDP will make boutiques out of trial lawyers;
it will become like the division in the United Kingdom
between barristers and solicitors. (0, 1)
This notion of increasing segmentation of the legal profession doesn't seem either threatening or
promising, but the two types do agree on it.
76. Moreover, neither Type indicated a strong reaction to the possibility of increasing
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When firms get huge, the public needs
safeguards, but the legal profession is very
good at developing these safeguards. (-1, -3)
This was actually a consensus statement for all three Types.
Unfortunately, because the statement is double-barreled, it is difficult to
discern which part of it they reject. This response may mean that
neither Type finds the legal profession good at developing safeguards
for the public. Or, it might also mean that neither Type thinks the
public needs additional protection from lawyers practicing in larger
firms. Without a determination about precisely what the participants
were reacting to in their response to the statement, it is difficult to know
how to use this theme to bridge the divide separating the Types. One
other statement attracts consensus between the two Types. Dealing with
consumerism, it is statement #21:
Most of the larger businesses have the opposite
of one-stop shopping: instead of wanting all
services from one provider, they are splitting
up their legal work among several law firms.
(0, +2)
They both think that businesses are distributing their legal work to an
increasing number of providers, rather than consolidating it in search of
one-stop shopping. Type III strongly thinks that individual consumers
seeking legal advice support one-stop shopping, while Type I thinks that
consumers do not want it. Neither group finds the one-stop argument
applicable in the business setting.
enforcement of UPL restrictions against people currently giving legal advice within Big Five
CPA firms. Both Types recorded a rather neutral response to statement #45:
Accountancy firms recruit attorneys at very substantial
salaries; these attorneys do much the same work as in a
law firm, only for higher salaries. Their work is called
legal planning to suit ethical rules. (-1, -1)
The threat of UPL in this context leaves both Types I and III unruffled. And, both are also
indifferent to a potential mechanism for enforcement of practice rules under MDP: a heavy fee
imposed on MDPs. They have virtually no reaction to statement #17:
An expensive annual fee in connection with doing MDP would
limit MDP to the big boys: only the megabanks and
financially driven accountancy firms could afford such a
cost. (0, 0)
So, besides not minding gaps in the present system of UPL enforcement, they are not eager to
increase enforcement of UPL violations either. A significant annual fee for establishing and
maintaining an MDP firm could finance ongoing audits of MDP in a proactive supervisory
system, but these lawyers are not worried about controls over practice.
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D. The Meager Area of Consensus Between Types I and II
Since Types I and II are polar opposites, there is little consensus
between them: only six statements out of the 55 come in with scores
close enough to rate as non-differentiating items. Each of the six
statements on which they do agree is relegated to the middle of their
sorts. In brief, these viewpoints agree only on points that are of relative
unimportance to them. In the interest of better understanding their
outlooks, these six statements are scrutinized here.
Ethics Conservatives and MDP Enthusiasts agree most on statement
#27 (a three-Type consensual statement):
Some large law firms see MDP as a way of saving
their practice; it is a godsend. These firms
anticipate being bought out. (-1, 0)
Both Types disagree that large firms are embracing MDP out of
financial duress. So members of each of these opposed schools of
thought discount at least one alleged hidden motive behind the drive to
permit MDPs. Statement #31 (nearly consensual among all three
Types) also elicits agreement:
Attorneys from the same firm, even a very large
firm, even unacquainted, can meet and pool
information; therein lays [sic] the conflict of
interest and the reason for imputation. (1, 0)
Here they neither reject nor acknowledge the reasoning behind the
imputation rule. It is simply unproblematic for them. Statement #15
(nearly consensual among all three Types) also is consensual:
Paying an ambulance driver for a referral to a
medical malpractice case is a moral outrage;
but under MDP, it would not be a moral outrage
to pay a financial planner for a referral to
draw up a will. (0, 0)
Neither side acknowledges the parallel between the present rule and the
proposed change. Both sides agree also on statement #7 (which is
nearly consensual among all three Types):
There is a dichotomy between a large user of
services and an individual small user of
services. Larger users of services often deal
with a lot of money, and they're concerned
about the best, the quickest, and the most
efficient services. It doesn't have to be the
cheapest. (1, 0)
The low scores mean both Types are uninterested in this key distinction
among different types of consumers of legal services. Both Types are
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also uninterested in how non-lawyer superiors treat attorneys working in
non-law firms, even though these attorneys' workplace experience is a
quasi-experiment (and potential predictor) of how attorneys might fare
in a multidisciplinary practice entity. This subject is broached in
statement #30:
When a member of the bar works for a non-law
firm, you're not an attorney, you're an
employee with legal skills. (0, +2)
Finally, statement #37 focuses on conditions of competition with other
providers of legal services which does not particularly interest either
Type I or Type II respondents:
What if corporations cut law firms out because
they say, "Well, gee, I can go to the
accounting firm and get this package and I
really don't need you guys. You know, you just
make it more complicated with all the rules and
strictures you have." (1, 0)
There is little basis for building bridges between Types I and II on any
MDP issues that have much meaning, since the members of these two
groups are so far apart in their thinking. They do agree on two points.
First, neither group believes that lawyers in large firms are campaigning
for MDP so that they can be bought out. Second, neither disputes the
importance of imputing conflicts of interest. Furthermore, they share a
lack of concern regarding the problems encountered by lawyers who
would be working for non-lawyers, the increasingly competitive
conditions some law firms face, the moral ironies that MDP rules might
cause and the distinction between types of clients.
E. Consensus Among All Three Types
The three Types showed strong differences of opinion over the
specific MDP issues mentioned in most Q-statements, as could be
anticipated from the wide spread of subject placement across the arc of
opinion (see Figure 1).77 Only two statements in the entire set of 55 did
not provoke statistically significant differences in scores among at least
one pair of the three Types. Six other statements showed fairly low
point spreads among the three Types, but for each of these statements
one or two pairs of Types assigned scores showing statistically
significant differences. Most of these statements figure into shared
views between pairs of Types. Moreover, only one of these eight
statements is central to any Type's viewpoint (i.e., is a statement
77. See supra p. 636 (displaying Figure 1).
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receiving a score from 3 to 5), so subjects bury consensual statements in
the middle of their sorts, while finding the controversial statements
more relevant and appealing. Despite both the general lack of
agreement and the lack of centrality to subjects' views of the topics on
which there was agreement, some understanding can still be gleaned
from looking at these areas of consensus.
The two most consensual statements were #27 and #9. Statement #27
asserts:
Some large law firms see MDP as a way of saving
their practice; it is a godsend. These firms
anticipate being bought out. (-1, 0, -1)
All views disagree, but only slightly. This statement, originally made in
a telephone interview by a managing partner of a large law firm, may
strike most subjects as conjectural since no aspect of MDP is close to
being adopted. Statement #9 bears on a core value of the profession,
protecting the general public:
When firms get huge, the public needs
safeguards, but the legal profession is very
good at developing these safeguards. (-1, -3,
-2)
The disagreement, especially from Types II and III, could reflect either
disagreement that the public needs safeguards, or that the legal
profession is good at developing safeguards, or possibly, that the
safeguards the legal profession does develop are good. The scoring
difference of Type I (not statistically significant) is what one would
expect from Ethics Conservatives, who are much more insistent on the
need for such safeguards and barriers than are members of the other two
groups.
Six other statements are only slightly less consensual (on these, one
pair, or two pairs of Types, do disagree significantly). Statement #53
hints at suspicions regarding UPL activities among those working as in-
house counsel for banks:
Law officers of banks do give contracts to bank
customers and people do sign them without going
to see an independent attorney. They trust the
bank, and they don't have an attorney. (1, 2,
2).
The difference between Type I and Type III is significant at .01 level.
All viewpoints agree that this is occurring but are not upset about it; the
statement itself gives an excuse for UPL (the bank customers' trust of
his or her financial institution). Type III is more alert on this subject,
which probably plays into Liberals' other reasons for wanting change
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and for supporting MDP. It is noteworthy that no Type in this study
shows a particular desire for the pro-active crackdown on UPL which
can be read into the resolution adopted by the ABA's House of
Delegates78 and exhibited by prosecutors in New Jersey and Florida.79
All accept that UPL goes on, but it's not central to their thinking about
MDP at present. Statement #7 focuses on differences between the
various consumers of legal services:
There is a dichotomy between a large user of
services and an individual small user of
services. Larger users of services often deal
with a lot of money, and they're concerned
about the best, the quickest, and the most
efficient services. It doesn't have to be the
cheapest. (1, 0, 1)
The difference between Type I and Type III is significant at .05 level,
while the difference between Type 11 and Type III is significant at .01
level.
This proposition seems self-evident but is far from central to any Type's
thinking on MDP. Type III agrees with it more than do Types I and II,
possibly from the Liberals' concern with consumers and also their
marketing focus. Statement #15 presents an irony:
Paying an ambulance driver for a referral to a
medical malpractice case is a moral outrage;
but under MDP, it would not be a moral outrage
to pay a financial planner for a referral to
draw up a will. (0, 0, -1)
The difference between Type I and Type III is significant at the .001
level.
The irony doesn't play well, sinking to nearly everyone's zone of
indifference. Type III shows significantly more disagreement. Concern
with core values is seen in statement #3 1:
Attorneys from the same firm, even a very large
firm, even unacquainted, can meet and pool
information; therein lays [sic] the conflict of
interest and the reason for imputation. (1, 0,
-1)
78. On July 11, 2000, the delegates adopted a resolution urging, among other things, that
"[sitate bar associations and other entities charged with attorney discipline should reaffirm their
commitment to enforcing vigorously their respective law governing lawyers" and "[e]ach
jurisdiction should reevaluate and refine to the extent necessary the definition of the 'practice of
law."' 16 ABA-BNA, LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 367 (1984).
79. Information regarding the enforcement of provisions prohibiting the unauthorized practice
of law is on file with the authors.
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The difference between Type I and Type III is significant at .001 level.
But the specific rationale for imputation is unproblematic for all,
although Type III, in disagreeing more strongly, may doubt that
attorneys from the same firm necessarily pool information. The next
two statements bear on buyouts of law firms. Statement #51 addresses
the question of market value:
In buying professional practices, outside firms
look for an annuity practice-an assured annual
income. But most law firms don't have this.
(0, -1, -2)
The difference between Type I and Type III is significant at .001
level; the difference between Type I and Type II is significant at .001
level.
This declaration is obviously speculative, because the market value of
law firms to non-attorney purchasers seeking to profit from the sale of
commodified legal services has not been tested.80 All Types are
indifferent to the notion that law firms might be put up for sale, but
Types II and III are less willing to entertain the speculation. This
statement is double-barreled, so we are unsure whether they are
disagreeing with the idea that outside firms look for an assured annual
income, or the idea that most law firms lack such an annuity income.
Since there is little experience with selling law firms (and virtually none
in selling law practices to non-attorneys), the idea that outside acquirers
look for an annuity income could be considered speculative, so that the
lawyers may be rejecting the idea that law firms do not yield an annuity
income. Statement #54 has to do with the motivation for selling a law
firm:
Law firms would be very tempted by an
acquisition, whether by another law firm or an
accountancy firm. For senior partners, it
boils down to a question of who is going to pay
me my money? (1, -1, -1)
80. For a discussion of the commodification of legal services, see Carol A. Needham,
Permitting Lawyers to Participate in Multidisciplinary Practices: Business as Usual or End of
the Profession as We Know It?, 84 MIN. L. REV. 135 (2000). See also Kenneth Anderson, A
New Class of Lawyers: The Therapeutic as Rights Talk, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1062 (1996); James
A. Fanto, When Those Who Do Teach: The Consequences of Law Firm Education for Business
Law Education, 34 GA. L. RE V. 839, 848 (2000); Steven H. Hobbs, Ethics in the Age of
Entrepreneurship, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 599 (1998); Douglas E. Litowitz, Young Lawyers and
Alienation: A Look at Legal Proletariat, 84 ILL. B.J. 144 (1996); Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation
and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REV. 15, n.7 (1995); Mark C. Suchman, Working Without a
Net: The Sociology of Legal Ethics in Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 837, 857-58
(1998); Allan W. Vestal, Special Ethical and Fiduciary Challenges for Law Firms Under the New
and Revised Unincorporated Business Forms, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 445 (1998).
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The difference between Type I and Type III is significant at .001 level.
The difference between Type I and Type II is significant at .01 level.
Again, all react with indifference, but Type I is more willing to consider
the idea than are Liberals and MDP Enthusiasts.
V. CONCLUSION
Our data suggest that the legal profession is not yet fully prepared to
face MDP. We write this from varying standpoints: one author, a
lawyer, a law teacher and an ethicist, sees MDP from inside the legal
profession; the other, a non-lawyer political scientist and opinion
analyst, sees it from the outside. Most attorneys participating in this
study were Ethics Conservatives (Type I), while fewer were Liberals
(Type III), and fewer still were MDP Enthusiasts (Type II). Our
sampling procedures give us no way of knowing how well this
proportional distribution of Types reflects the feelings of members of
the Bar, but some conjecture can be justified.
The Ethics Conservative view is probably the most predominant view
held by lawyers who have thought about MDP. Of course, many
lawyers have not yet thought about the issue in much detail at all, and
find it remote from their lives and work. The ABA group interviews of
lawyers in three locations showed that most lawyers were unconcerned
about MDP and cutting-edge internet practice issues because they didn't
consider their work affected by these issues. 81 The two types of lawyers
who were most concerned about these trends were firm decision-makers
and the youngest cohort of associates in the largest firms. 82 This is a
sensible assumption for several reasons. First, ethical conservatism is
the ideology to which attorneys have been exposed from the time they
entered law school. Second, we would expect conservative views to be
most common in areas of the profession less sensitive to economic
challenges in the practice of law. Even if lawyers are threatened by
some economic shifts, they may be so busy tending their practices and
doing their work that they do not look ahead. Third, we would expect
that lawyers becoming aware of the MDP issue would generate ideas
about it from the worldview they already have, and that worldview is
probably ethical conservatism. If the Ethical Conservative view
represents the status quo, any gains among lawyers for the Liberal or the
81. The group interviews were held in May and June 2000. The Pulse of the Legal Profession,
Phase 1, Report to the Market Research Department of the American Bar Association, at 27 (Nov.
22, 2000).
82. See id.
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MDP Enthusiast view must come at the expense of the established
ideology.
Granting this presupposition, we must consider what likelihood there
is that discussion among lawyers of the three Types will contribute to
attitude shifts. MDP Enthusiasts and Liberals find much in common,
but any agreement they might reach on MDP would probably be
scorned by the Ethics Conservatives. Any effort towards resolution
would have to include the Ethics Conservatives, because insofar as
lawyers begin to think about this issue they are likely to think in terms
of ethical conservatism. The lawyers in this study did think about MDP
by working through the Q-sorts, but many lawyers who received the Q-
sort did not send in results. They either had no time or started the task
and found it displeasing, uninteresting, remote or burdensome. Because
many lawyers currently passing on the issue would likely become
Ethics Conservatives once they actively consider it, working towards
any resolution of the issue without involving the Ethics Conservatives
would be pointless.
The Ethics Conservatives are closer to the Liberals and farthest from
the MDP Enthusiasts. The MDP Enthusiasts should probably be left out
of any preliminary dialogue. They criticize conventional wisdom, and
if they pipe up too much, they would provoke a strong negative reaction
from the Ethics Conservatives. A dialogue between Liberals and Ethics
Conservatives could be more fruitful. But this dialogue should start
from matters in which they share a consensus. Both Types see pitfalls
in MDP, so discussion could begin with this topic. Liberals' worries
about these difficulties could reassure the Ethics Conservatives that they
are dealing with kindred people. Participants in these discussions
should consider whether there are aspects of MDP that they can accept
as less or not at all dangerous. For instance, since both Types reject the
idea of pro-active prosecution of UPL, a secondary topic could be the
types of UPL that now take place under the status quo, and why these
are acceptable. If practices that are not completely legitimate can be
tolerated without danger, what other practices currently deemed
illegitimate might also be tolerated? Discussion should explore the
safeguards that might be devised; should the legal profession devise
these safeguards, or is it not particularly adept at doing so (note
discussion of statement #9).83 Expanding on these consensus areas
shared by Types I and III as bridges to other possible areas of consensus
could help generate other areas of agreement, and this process might
83. See supra pp. 653, 669, 672-73 and 676
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unveil aspects of MDP that would be less alarming to the Ethics
Conservatives.
Further discussion between Liberals and Ethics Conservatives could
explore the practical meaning of conflict of interest. Liberals conceive
of clients as guiding the classification process, as seen in their high
agreement with statement #14, 84 the question for them is whether or not
the client wants the relationship to continue despite the conflict. Ethics
Conservatives, however, reject client disclosures as a means of
circumventing a conflict of interest. A key question in such discussion
could be the extent to which clients should be entitled to determine that
they do not need protection against a conflict of interest. Working
toward an even more central question, the discussion should also focus
on the extent to which a prima facie conflict of interest is a true conflict
of interest. Attorneys involved in such discussions would have to
imagine answering these questions in multiple practice contexts,
ranging from the large firm to the small firm or solo practice. The
different circumstances in practice contexts could mean different
answers to the key questions.
The presumption that ethical conservatism is the predominant (even
if inchoate) view in the profession may be venturesome, and certainly is
empirically untested, but it is grounded in common sense, and may be
usefully blended with this study's results. Using it speculatively to
bring together not the two most similar Types but the two Types whose
views would make for the most fruitful discussions might allow
progress towards a broader synthesis of ideas on multidisciplinary
practice.
84. See supra p. 656-57.
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Appendix I:
Q-Statements
1. Staff in law firms now share in the lawyer's privilege; other
professionals in the law firm could come to share in the privilege also.
For instance, an accountant and lawyer who work together on a client's
problems should both enjoy privilege.
2. Conflict of interest is based not just on the existence of a conflict
but on the volume of that interest.
3. There may not be a business problem with MDP but there is a
confidentiality problem. It gets back to the hard ethical questions that
govern lawyers but not accountants or any of the folks that we're
talking about combining with.
4. One of the things that the Big Five bring to the table is an
enormous amount of capital. They can hire additional staff, and they
can provide economies of scale and efficiency. There's some benefit to
this.
5. I don't think the system is broken. I don't really think it needs
that big of a fix. I think all the disciplines need to work together. I'm
not sure we all have to work in the same office together.
6. By most estimates more than half the adults in the United States
don't have a will. What if an individual's financial advisor could pair
with a lawyer to provide this service? That individual could get advice
on how to invest for retirement and then step down the hall to work with
a lawyer on a will.
7. There is a dichotomy between a large user of services and an
individual small user of services. Larger users of services often deal
with a lot of money, and they're concerned about the best, the quickest,
and the most efficient services. It doesn't have to be the cheapest.
8. One-stop shopping pressures the consumer. Suddenly there's a
referral; one's hand is forced a little.
9. When firms get huge, the public needs safeguards, but the legal
profession is very good at developing these safeguards.
10. The reason for the prohibition on fee splitting is to try to keep the
lines clear so you can refer clients to me; but I'm not going to give you
any money in return for the referral. This process guards my
professional independence.
11. I wouldn't have a problem with a corporation of attorneys
directed by and officered by attorneys being owned in a non-voting
capacity by a CPA firm.
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12. Big groups with money can push MDP and nobody's going to
have the money to really keep it from happening. The real question is:
If it's going to happen, can it be done in a controlled way that will lead
to the best outcome for the consumer as well as being realistic for the
professionals?
13. A system of loose alliances among professional firms is a lot
more comfortable and less constraining than MDPs.
14. The key way to avoid conflict of interest is to make a disclosure
to the client: does the client want the relationship to continue despite
this?
15. Paying an ambulance driver for a referral to a medical
malpractice case is a moral outrage; but under MDP, it would not be a
moral outrage to pay a financial planner for a referral to draw up a will.
16. If lawyers would be in the minority in an MDP, conflict of
interest as lawyers see it could be overruled.
17. An expensive annual fee in connection with doing MDP would
limit MDP to the big boys: only the megabanks and financially driven
accountancy firms could afford such a cost.
18. If an MDP formed with a counselor and a lawyer, the counselor
could get referrals from the in-house lawyer. But the problem is that in
a divorce case the lawyer would want the mental health person to
support one side-the firm's position. This would compromise the
professional ethics of the mental health professional.
19. Publicly-held clients would accept consolidated service providers
easily because they would feel comfortable getting service from a
provider with a well-known trademark name.
20. The idea that MDP is motivated by the desire to promote one-
stop shopping is just smoke.
21. Most of the larger businesses have the opposite of one-stop
shopping: instead of wanting all services from one provider, they are
splitting up their legal work among several law firms.
22. A partnership with a lawyer, an accountant, and a financial
planner would work well.
23. If MDP is permitted, law firms would be unlikely to buy out
accountancy firms. The law firms don't have enough money, and the
legal mindset would also prevent it.
24. If conflict of interest can be resolved in a large law firm, it can be
resolved in a merged accountancy-law firm.
25. Many accountancy firms would buy out law firms quickly if the
rules of legal practice were liberalized.
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26. The principal arguments for retaining such prohibitions relate to
concerns about the profession's core values, specifically professional
independence of judgment, the protection of confidential client
information, and loyalty to the client through the avoidance of conflicts
of interest.
27. Some large law firms see MDP as a way of saving their practice;
it is a godsend. These firms anticipate being bought out.
28. Currently, if you have an attorney and an accountant who are
independent of each other, the client has the advantage of having two
separate professionals, each looking over the other's shoulder. You are
going to lose that by putting them both in one firm. Their interest will
be the same and you've lost the objectivity that comes from having two
independent professionals.
29. The Big Five accountancy firms have been using lawyers for
years; we have Unauthorized Practice of Law (UPL) now. We ought to
come out into the open with it and let it be regulated.
30. When a member of the bar works for a non-law firm, you're not
an attorney, you're an employee with legal skills.
31. Attorneys from the same firm, even a very large firm, even
unacquainted, can meet and pool information; therein lays [sic] the
conflict of interest and the reason for imputation.
32. If the members of the MDP deliver legal services and violate one
of the rules, there would be a sanction-such as the MDP losing the
right to provide legal services.
33. The ABA proposal for regulating MDPs is just a sop put in to
make MDP more palatable.
34. This is going to happen. Whether it's going to be this year, next
year, or five years from now. It's just a question of when will Missouri
change its rules somewhat to allow MDP.
35. I don't think it's a question of whether you need to fix
something. I think the question is, do you need to inhibit something?
Do you need to restrict something? We're talking about a restraint on
activities and whether the restraint should be there or not.
36. If enough people stand up and say that MDP is not inevitable, it
won't be inevitable.
37. What if corporations cut law firms out because they say, "Well,
gee, I can go to the accounting firm and get this package and I really
don't need you guys. You know, you just make it more complicated
with all the rules and strictures you have."
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38. The consolidators in the CPA profession are piranhas. They
come in and gobble up. They want you to work for a pittance and tell
you what to do.
39. In acquiring law firms, accountants would embrace regulation.
Accountants are always subject to regulation and are used to it; AICPA
rules are very strict.
40. Adoption of MDP will make boutiques out of trial lawyers; it
will become like the division in the United Kingdom between barristers
and solicitors.
41. For the purposes of a conflict of interest analysis, the lawyer
would have to treat each and every client of the MDP as his/her own
client.
42. MDP could bring into existence some economies of scale in legal
services that would help middle class people.
43. No lawyers are now audited for misconduct; someone should be
looking at things more closely. The lawyer disciplinary process should
be more proactive.
44. Often, clients must bounce from office to office, and those
professionals in the various disciplines have to adjust and readjust to
members of the team the client has already selected.
45. Accountancy firms recruit attorneys at very substantial salaries;
these attorneys do much the same work as in a law firm, only for higher
salaries. Their work is called legal planning to suit ethical rules.
46. MDP is not a rules change motivated by the desire to provide
better service to clients. It is possible to do this now by sharing offices.
47. MDP contains no pitfalls for lawyers; it would enhance most
lawyers' careers.
48. If MDP arrives, the big will get bigger, while small and middle
sized specialized accountants and attorneys will get squeezed out.
49. With accountancy firms involved in the law, there would be
more jobs for lawyers.
50. Family lawyers are in this little boutique area where people hire
them because they have experience with the judges and custody issues.
MDP won't encroach on this type of practice.
51. In buying professional practices, outside firms look for an
annuity practice-an assured annual income. But most law firms don't
have this.
52. There would be advantages for a small firm to be able to team up
with someone else and be able to provide more services to its clients.
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But a large firm would also like MDP because large firms are always
trying to add practice areas to service their clients.
53. Law officers of banks do give contracts to bank customers and
people do sign them without going to see an independent attorney.
They trust the bank, and they don't have an attorney.
54. Law firms would be very tempted by an acquisition, whether by
another law firm or an accountancy firm. For senior partners, it boils
down to a question of who is going to pay me my money?
55. The MDP regulatory body would need to protect the lawyer from
his or her superiors; that lawyer would need Supreme Court backup if
there were any interference with attorney judgment.
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Appendix II:
Selected Traits of Subjects
Subject
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
Gender Profession Other Information
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of 6-15
_attorneys
Female Attorney Private Practice, solo
Male Accountant Private Practice
Female Attorney Private Practice, solo
Male Attorney Private Practice, solo
Male Financial Agency
Planner
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of 2-5
attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of 2-5
attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of 6-15
attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of 6-15
attorneys
Male Attorney Also a CPA
Male Counseling Clinical Practice
I Psychologist
Male non-lawyer anonymous Q-sort
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of more
than 40 attorneys
Male Attorney CPA firm, more than 40 attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of 6-15
attorneys
Male non-lawyer anonymous Q-sort
Male Attorney Government, more than 40
attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of 6-15
attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of more
than 40 attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of 16-40
attorneys
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Female Attorney Other, no other information
Female Counseling Private Practice
Psychologist
Male Counseling Private Practice
Psychologist
Male Financial Agency
Planner
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of 6-15
attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of 2-5
attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of 2-5
attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of 2-5
attorneys
Male Attorney Other, no other information
Male Counseling Private Practice
Psychologist
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of more
than 40 attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of 2-5
attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of 2-5
attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of 2-5
attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, solo
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of 16-40
attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of 6-15
attorneys
Female Financial Large Agency
Planner
Female Attorney Private Practice, firm of more
than 40 attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of 6-15
attorneys
Female Attorney Private Practice, firm of 6-15
attorneys
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Male Attorney Government
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of 2-5
attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of more
than 40 attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of more
than 40 attorneys
Female Attorney Private Practice, solo
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of 2-5
attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of 2-5
attorneys
Female Attorney Private Practice, firm of 16-40
attorneys
Male Attorney Other, no other information
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of 2-5
attorneys
Male Attorney Managing Partner, firm of 16-40
attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of 6-15
attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of 16-40
attorneys
Female Attorney Private Practice, firm of 16-40
attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of 6-15
attorneys
Male Attorney Other, no other information
Female Attorney Private Practice, firm of 2-5
attorneys
Female Attorney Private Practice, firm of 16-40
attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of more
than 40 attorneys
Male Attorney Business
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of more
than 40 attorneys
Female Attorney Private Practice, firm of 6-15
attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, solo
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Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of 6-15
attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, solo
Male Attorney Managing Partner, firm of 16-40
attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of 2-5
attorneys
Female Attorney Private Practice, firm of more
than 40 attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of more
than 40 attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of more
than 40 attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of more
than 40 attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of more
than 40 attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of more
than 40 attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of more
than 40 attorneys
Female Attorney Government, group of 16-40
attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of 6-15
attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of more
than 40 attorneys
Female Attorney Private Practice, firm of 2-5
attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of more
than 40 attorneys
Female Attorney Business
Male Attorney Managing Partner, firm of more
than 40 attorneys
Female Attorney Private Practice, firm of more
than 40 attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, firm of more
than 40 attorneys
Male Attorney Private Practice, Solo
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Male I  Attorney Private Practice, firm of morel Att y Ithan 40 attorneys
